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ABSTRACT: 
In this paper we exploit the choice allowed by IFRS regarding the presentation of interest 
payments on the cash flow statement to answer two related questions: First, whether the 
classification choice is explained by firm reporting incentives and second, whether it is value 
relevant. Using a UK sample, we find that firms reporting losses, with a greater proportion of 
their debt stemming from public sources, with CFO-based covenants and greater increases in 
leverage in the year of adoption are less likely to report interest payments in cash flows from 
operating activities (CFOA). Results also suggest that the incentive to meet or beat analyst 
CFO forecasts decreases, but strong corporate governance increases the probability of 
including interest payments in CFOA. Based on the assumption that the decision not to 
classify interest payments in CFOA captures lower disclosure quality or poor future expected 
performance, we posit that these firms should also exhibit lower valuations. Results obtained 
after correcting for self-selection bias confirm this assertion. We conclude that managers’ 
decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA is consistent with the opportunistic use of 
the choice allowed by IFRS.  
 
2 
 
The determinants and valuation effects of classification choice on the statement of cash flows 
“Therefore, how an entity presents information in its financial statements is of utmost 
importance in communicating financial information to those who use that information to 
make decisions in their capacity as capital providers.” (IASB, October 2008, p.21)1 
1. Introduction 
The ongoing project of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) on financial 
statement presentation addresses concerns that the choices embedded in existing disclosure 
requirements result in information that is inconsistently presented.  As the above quote by the 
IASB suggests, these inconsistencies can limit users’ understanding of the relationship 
between an entity’s financial statements and its financial results (IASB, October 2008, p.13). 
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on this assertion by first examining whether firm 
incentives explain the decision not to include interest payments in the cash-flows from 
operating activities section of the statement of cash flows, (CFOA), and second by linking 
this choice to firm value. Given that cash flows from operations, (CFO), is an important 
measure of firm performance and hence valuation, we examine whether the decision not to 
include interest paid in CFOA is driven by opportunistic motives.  
We acknowledge that choosing not to classify interest payments in CFOA can be explained in 
two ways. First, firms may choose to classify interest payments in cash flows from financing 
activities (CFFA) under the assumption that this classification better reflects the nature of 
these expenditures, in the spirit of IASB’s proposed treatment. Second, firms may choose not 
to include these payments in CFOA in an attempt to inflate the CFO number. Mulford and 
Comiskey, (2005, p.131), acknowledge that the classification choice allows firms to inflate 
the CFO number: “Within the boundaries of GAAP are numerous opportunities to alter 
operating cash flow by classifying what are seemingly financing items as operating or vice 
versa. In the process, apparent operating performance can be altered.” We, thus, argue that if 
firms exploit the choice allowed by IFRS to inflate their CFO number, their choice not to 
include interest payments in CFOA should be explained by the contractual or market 
incentives they face. Contractual incentives motivate managers to inflate CFO to avoid 
violating contractual agreements which are based on financial information, such as debt 
covenants, while market incentives motivate managers to inflate CFO to influence 
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 IASB Discussion Paper, Preliminary Views on Financial Statement Presentation, October 2008. 
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shareholder perceptions. In addition, if the classification choice reflects management’s 
opportunistic behavior, it is possible that this choice should also be associated with firm 
value. We argue that if the decision not to include interest paid in CFOA is motivated by the 
need to inflate CFO, then such choice should be associated with lower firm valuations for two 
reasons: First, the resulting lower comparability between earnings and CFO may reflect lower 
disclosure quality, increasing the likelihood that the firm is also withholding value-relevant 
information, and increasing in turn, perceived information asymmetry. Second, a firm that 
cannot commit to including interest payments in CFOA signals the market that a favorable 
future financial performance cannot be assured. Both of these arguments suggest that the 
choice not to include interest payments in CFOA should be associated with lower firm 
valuations.  
The mandatory switch to IFRS in the UK entailed the use of an altogether different format for 
reporting changes in cash flows from the more rigid treatment required under UK GAAP, 
providing a unique setting to examine our research question. Examining the choice of UK 
firms has the added advantage of being observed in a country with high levels of judicial 
efficiency and information transparency enabling us to more effectively link the presentation 
choice to individual firm characteristics. In addition, unlike earnings management or 
classification shifting studies, our research setting does not entail the concealment of 
accounting measurement changes. In essence, we are able to examine whether reporting 
incentives affect pure presentation choices, a simpler but perhaps more fundamental question, 
which is not influenced by reputational or litigation concerns, but can be motivated by both 
contractual and market incentives. Unlike other research settings for which the timing of an 
accounting choice is difficult to discern, the switch to IFRS provides firms with a one-time 
decision that is aligned in time, creating a unique research setting that allows us to more 
strongly link the presentation choice both to firm characteristics before, and to firm value, 
after this is made.
2
  
Our sample consists of 231 UK firms that mandatorily adopted IFRS during the year 2005 
and for which valuation information is available. Results provide evidence that contractual 
and market incentives are associated with lower, whereas strong corporate governance with 
higher likelihood of including interest paid in CFOA. Specifically, firms reporting losses, 
                                                          
2
 The classification choice of interest paid is rather sticky and is, at least to some extent, related to IASB 
requirements. According to IAS 7.31, “interest and dividends received and paid may be classified as 
operating, investing, or financing cash flows, provided that they are classified consistently from period to 
period”. 
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with greater increases in leverage, with a greater proportion of their debt being public instead 
of private and with CFO related covenants are less likely to classify interest paid in CFOA, 
consistent with contractual agreements affecting their presentation choices. Results also 
suggest that the incentive to meet or beat analyst cash flow forecasts is associated with a 
lower firm tendency to classify interest paid in CFOA. Finally, we find that the presence of a 
financial expert on the audit committee, and the effort exerted by the auditor as captured by 
higher audit fees are associated with a higher likelihood of including interest payments in 
CFOA.  
We also examine whether the presentation choice made on the statement of cash-flows, 
(SCF), is associated with firm value.  Our results suggest that the choice of firms not to 
present interest payments in CFOA is associated with lower values of Tobin’s q, suggesting 
that this choice provides new, albeit, negative information to the market. We corroborate 
these results by examining the change in firm valuations around the IFRS switch. Results 
confirm the conclusion that the decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA is 
associated with smaller changes in firm values. Overall, this evidence suggests that the 
classification choice allowed under IFRS has not benefited all adopting firms, in line with the 
results in Charitou, Karamanou and Lambertides (2014) who find that for some firms the 
move to IFRS induces them to reveal their bad news, in turn increasing the firm’s default 
risk. Even though Charitou et al. (2014) do not discuss how this negative news is actually 
revealed to the market, our evidence suggests that a possible mechanism through which this 
negative information is conveyed is the firm’s classification choice on the statement of cash 
flows. Taken together, our results suggest that financial statement presentation choices are 
exploited by firms when the incentives to do so are strong, but at the same time, they are 
significantly related to firm value. We, thus, infer that the firm’s choice even though driven 
by contractual and market incentives, also serves as an indication of lower financial 
information quality and a negative signal regarding the firm’s future performance.   
We contribute to the accounting literature in three ways. First, we extend the literature on 
earnings management by examining whether reporting incentives are also associated with 
management presentation choices. We argue that presentation choices related to the statement 
of cash flows can affect both investor and creditor perceptions and in turn influence market 
and contractual outcomes, without altering the final reported cash balance. In this respect, the 
SCF presentation choice is equivalent to expense classification shifting on the income 
statement, which also does not affect bottom line earnings (McVay, 2006). Unlike 
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classification shifting though, this classification choice is a pure presentation choice that does 
not involve questionable reporting practices, thus enabling us to isolate and examine 
management presentation decisions independently from those whose impact on measurement 
is difficult to detect. In addition, the fact that the timing of the presentation choice can be 
accurately defined, enables us to examine whether this presentation choice is related to firm 
valuations.  
Second, we extend the limited literature that examines the importance of the CFO number, in 
general, and the tendency of firms to manipulate it, in particular. Nurnberg (2006) suggests 
that CFO is important not only because it is used in fundamental investment analysis but also 
because it is used as a measure of corporate performance that can, often, be superior to net 
income. Yet, despite the importance of CFO only a handful of studies were able to document 
that CFO can be subject to manipulation (Mulford and Comiskey, 2005; Lee, 2012). This 
limited evidence on CFO management is consistent with the general belief that CFO is less 
prone to manipulation than earnings are, as often claimed in the financial press. One of the 
reasons that contribute to this belief is the limited discretion managers have in computing 
CFO in contrast to the considerable discretion that GAAP provides in the computation of net 
income. The switch to IFRS increases this discretion, creating a unique opportunity to 
provide further evidence on CFO management. 
Finally, we contribute to the IFRS literature which has predominantly examined the effects of 
accounting measurement choices on important firm financial characteristics. The 2005 
mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) aimed to enhance 
the comparability of financial statements, improve corporate disclosure, and increase the 
quality of financial reporting (EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). Consistent with these 
expectations, the majority of related studies find that IFRS adoption resulted in significant 
capital market benefits to firms.
3
 Perhaps more closely related to our research question is 
research examining the effects of IFRS adoption on properties of accounting earnings, but the 
evidence is mixed. On one hand, Barth, Landsman, Land and Williams (2012), and Gebhardt 
and Novotny-Farkas (2011) find evidence consistent with IFRS improving accounting 
quality, while Christensen, Lee and Walker (2008), Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013), and 
Atwood, Drake, Myers and Myers (2011) fail to document such improvement. This 
difference in documented research results highlights the need for more research in the area to 
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 Refer to Ball (2006), Soderstrom and Sun (2007), Pope and McLeay (2011), Brown (2011), Brown and Tarca 
(2012), and Brüggemann, Hitz and Sellhorn (2013) for a thorough review of the IFRS related literature. 
6 
 
help regulators and academics form a better understanding of the effects of the mandated 
IFRS adoption. A complete answer to this question cannot ignore the effects of IFRS on 
financial statement presentation, a question that has been largely ignored by related research. 
Our results should thus be of importance to capital market participants, practitioners, and 
standard setters as they still strive to assess the overall effect of the switch to IFRS.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
regulatory environment and develops our expectations based on a review of the theoretical 
and empirical literatures; section 3 describes our research design, while empirical results are 
presented in section 4; section 5 reports on additional robustness analyses and section 6 
concludes.     
2. Theoretical development, related literature and expectations 
2.1 Regulatory environment and firm accounting choice 
The more recent and limited literature on classification shifting examines whether firms 
utilize the different categories of financial statements to influence investor perceptions about 
the firm. Admittedly, classification shifting differs from the standard earnings management 
studies in that the misrepresentation of particular items on the financial statements is effected 
without altering bottom line earnings. One could argue that this type of manipulation is less 
invasive than earnings management as it does not alter the overall financial picture of the 
firm, even though it more strongly relies on investor fixation with specific line items on the 
financial statements or the differential importance of some items for contractual agreements. 
Bowen, Davis and Rajgopal (2002), for example, find that internet firms with greater 
individual investor interest adopt policies that inflate revenues but which do not affect bottom 
line net income. Engel, Erickson and Maydew (1999) find that firms reclassify obligations 
out of the liability sections of the balance sheet through the use of trust preferred stock 
issuance. McVay (2006) finds that managers opportunistically shift expenses from core 
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 Gordon, Henry, Jorgensen and Linthicum (2013) also examine the presentation choices related to the statement 
of cash flows for a sample of firms from thirteen European countries. Other than the fact that we focus our 
attention to UK firms only for the reasons explained above, our paper differs from theirs in another two 
important ways. First, in addition to examining financial distress as an incentive to include interest paid in 
CFFA we also examine whether this choice is affected by corporate governance characteristics that can 
significantly reduce the tendency to inflate CFO. Prior studies have shown that effective corporate governance 
mechanisms are related to increased disclosures and higher quality earnings (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) 
suggesting that they could also affect a firm’s propensity to inflate CFO. Second, we examine how the market 
perceives this presentation choice by relating it to firm value. Even though it is important to first examine the 
incentives behind any financial statement presentation choices, whether these choices have capital market 
consequences is equally important, especially when assessing the effectiveness of new regulations. 
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expenses to special items overstating core earnings but not affecting bottom line net income. 
Fan, Barua, Cready and Thomas (2010) extend McVay’s (2006) results and find that 
classification shifting is related to managers’ constrained ability to manipulate accruals, while 
Barua, Lin and Sbaraglia (2010) find that expense shifting is facilitated through income-
decreasing discontinued operations. All these studies employ a research setting that at least to 
some extent entails an element of earnings management or questionable reporting practices 
that cannot be easily detected. Unlike classification shifting studies, our research setting 
provides an opportunity to examine the much simpler and perhaps more fundamental 
question of whether firms alter their presentation choices when these have the power to affect 
contractual and market outcomes without being influenced by reputational or litigation 
concerns. 
To examine this research question we exploit the 2005 mandated IFRS adoption in the EU 
which forced UK firms to move from a rigid and inflexible format of the cash flow statement 
to one that allows flexibility in reporting specific cash outflows and inflows. Specifically, 
under UK GAAP (FRS 1) the cash flow statement is divided into nine clearly defined 
categories which do not provide much choice in the classification of specific items.
5
 Even if 
UK GAAP is rather strict in the way interest paid is classified, under IFRS (IAS 7) entities, 
other than financial institutions, have discretion over in which category of the SCF to include 
interest paid, interest received and dividends received. In this paper we examine the 
classification choice of interest paid given its negative effect on important financial 
performance measures, in general, and cash flows in particular. According to IASB interest 
paid may be classified as cash flows from operating activities given that it is included on the 
income statement and enters into the determination of profit and loss; alternatively, it can be 
classified as cash flows from financing activities as these are costs which arise from financing 
firm activities. 
Based on IASB’s logic it is entirely possible that firms may choose to include interest 
payments in the CFFA category on the statement of cash flows if they believe that this choice 
better depicts their financial circumstances and more appropriately relates these payments to 
their financing activities. It is also possible, however, that their classification choice is driven 
by opportunistic motives to inflate the CFO number. Related research explaining other 
                                                          
5
 Standard headings in FRS 1 are: Net cash from operating activities, Dividends from associates, Returns on 
investments and servicing of finance, Taxation, Capital expenditure, Acquisitions and disposals, Equity 
dividends paid, Management of liquid resources, and Financing. 
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accounting choices documents that firms choose methods allowed by GAAP in response to 
opportunistic incentives but which may not necessarily be the most appropriate, given their 
specific circumstances. Cormier and Magnan (2002) for example, find that oil and gas 
companies overstate earnings by using the full cost method, while Christensen and Nikolaev 
(2013) find that firms which exploit the option embedded in IFRS to revalue non-financial 
assets do so in response to contractual incentives. Thus, even though it is difficult to 
disentangle the two competing explanations, we posit that not choosing CFOA as the 
classification category cannot be completely independent from an attempt to affect the 
balance of CFO. We base this conjecture on two important facts:  
First, we argue that the importance of CFO in fulfilling the stewardship and valuation roles of 
financial information creates strong incentives to manipulate the reported number.  Mulford 
and Comiskey (2005) acknowledge that “our fundamental concepts of credit quality and 
valuation are based on projections of cash flow” (p. xiii). According to them a strong CFO 
number reflects the firm’s sustainable and strong cash-generating capability and captures an 
important measure of financial performance (p. xiii).  Yet, in contrast to the underlying 
common belief, operating cash flow can be manipulated, and this can be achieved either 
within or outside the boundaries of GAAP (Mulford, and Comiskey, 2005, xiii). Importantly, 
Mulford and Comiskey (2005, p.6), also acknowledge that even though the ending balance of 
cash is difficult to manipulate, the balances of cash flows from operating, investing, and 
financing activities are more susceptible to management. In essence, firms can show 
increases in CFO by shifting disbursements in the investing and financing sections of the 
SCF, thus, seemingly improving operating performance without changing the balance of total 
cash flows (Mulford, and Comiskey, 2005, xiii).  Anecdotal evidence, thus, suggests that the 
importance of CFO for valuation and stewardship purposes can create a strong incentive for 
managers to manipulate the number leaving open the question of whether managers will 
exploit the classification flexibility allowed by IFRS to influence investor perceptions.  
The importance of CFO for valuation purposes has been strongly supported by the academic 
literature. Even though Dechow (1994) finds evidence consistent with FASB’s conjecture 
that earnings are a better predictor of future cash flows (FASB 1978), more recent evidence 
suggests that cash flows have incremental information content and, thus, complement the 
information in earnings (Wasley and Wu, 2006; McInnis and Collins, 2011; Brown, Huang, 
and Pinello, 2013).  In a similar vein, DeFond and Hung (2003) find that operating cash flow 
forecasts are useful in interpreting earnings and assessing firm viability especially when there 
9 
 
is greater information uncertainty about the firm. Given the importance of operating cash 
flows, Lee (2012) hypothesizes that firms face incentives to manage reported CFO and finds 
that firms tend to manage CFO by shifting items between the categories of the SCF and by 
timing transactions that can boost the reported number, such as delaying payments to 
suppliers or accelerating collections from debtors.  
Second, we argue that in the absence of incentives to manage operating cash flows, firms 
would choose to classify interest payments in the CFOA section of the statement of cash 
flows as this would be more consistent with higher quality reporting. We base this conjecture 
on the comparability concept, an important characteristic of accounting quality. Even though 
the notion of comparability applies generally to financial statements, the FASB decided to 
require interest payments to be included in CFOA to better facilitate the comparison between 
net income and net cash flow from operating activities. Consistency in the determination of 
the two numbers is important since market participants rely on these two numbers to better 
gauge into the firm’s earnings quality. Comparing CFO to net income is a method that helps 
investors to assess the company’s ability to translate or convert profitability to cash 
generation. According to the Wall Street Journal, “Many investors take comfort in the quality 
of a company's earnings if they also see robust operating cash flow”.6 For example, higher 
CFO values positively affect the cash realization ratio, a common metric of earnings quality. 
Anecdotal evidence and standard accounting textbook discussions assert that higher values of 
the cash realization ratio reflect an increasing ability of the firm to realize cash from profits.
7
 
To evaluate earnings quality, such comparisons are also commonly suggested in financial 
statement analysis textbooks (e.g., Penman, 2001). Hence, the decision not to include interest 
paid in CFOA may capture an attempt by management to mislead investors regarding the 
reliability of the earnings number lowering in turn, the quality of the firm’s financial 
reporting.  
Thus, even though it is plausible that firms may choose to classify interest payments in the 
CFFA category if it better depicts their financial circumstances, the above discussion 
suggests that this choice cannot be completely unrelated to an attempt to inflate the CFO 
number. In essence, the choice firms face is a trade-off between enhancing the quality of 
financial reporting by increasing the comparability between earnings and operating cash flow 
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 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108206503284984227 
7
http://www.yourdictionary.com/cash-realization-ratio 
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and inflating the CFO number by including interest payments in CFFA to meet important 
contractual objectives or market thresholds.  
The UK setting is ideal to examine our research question not only because the move to IFRS 
provides firms with a choice that was not available before, but also because the UK 
institutional environment is characterized by enhanced enforcement while differences 
between UK GAAP and IFRS are small (Ding, Hope, Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2007; Bae, Tan 
and Welker, 2008). Most papers examining the impact of IFRS adoption have documented 
that the beneficial effect of IFRS is confined to countries with strong legal enforcement. This 
result has spurred the debate in the accounting literature on whether the observed IFRS 
capital market benefits are related to the accounting standards per se, or the concurrent 
changes in enforcement that the switch to IFRS has induced (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; 
Christensen, Hail and Leuz, 2013). Examining firm presentation choices allowed under IFRS 
in the UK, a country with strong legal enforcement in particular, provides an ideal research 
setting since in such environment firm reporting incentives are not affected by poor country 
enforcement, low quality local GAAP, or even investor lack of sophistication. Thus, our 
research design enables us to better link the presentation choice to individual firm 
characteristics and, in turn, to firm valuation. 
2.2 Classification choice and firm incentives 
In the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency theory framework, separation of ownership and 
control results in information asymmetries and conflicts of interest between managers and the 
firm’s outside stakeholders. The resulting information asymmetry allows managers to act 
opportunistically, in turn, motivating them to manage financial information in order to 
conceal their private control benefits and/or to deter outside stakeholders from interfering 
(Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). On the other hand, strong corporate governance 
mechanisms, should restrain the ability of managers to act opportunistically, and hence 
improve the financial reporting quality of the firm (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
Walker (2013) and Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) propose that earnings management, and 
hence firm accounting choices, can arise from contractual and asset pricing motivations, or 
from the need to influence external parties. These motives can be more broadly categorized in 
the two reporting incentives that Healy and Wahlen (1999) identify: Contractual incentives 
are based on the idea that firms which are closer to debt covenant violation face stronger 
incentives to manipulate financial statement information. Market incentives reflect an attempt 
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to influence a more specific group of stakeholders, i.e., shareholders and information 
intermediaries (see, Walker, 2013).  
Undoubtedly, CFO is an important financial statement number that can be especially 
important for contractual purposes. Anecdotal evidence suggests that among the most 
common financial ratios used in debt covenants is debt to cash flows from operations, i.e., the 
debt coverage ratio.
8
 Healy and Wahlen (1999), among others, suggest that managers’ 
opportunistic behavior towards CFO can derive, among a number of other motives, from their 
incentive to reduce the likelihood of violating loan covenants. Consistent with the debt-
covenant hypothesis, we expect that contractual incentives are stronger when a firm is close 
to violating a debt covenant or when its poor financial condition restricts its ability to meet 
contractual terms. Specifically, we expect that the existence of CFO related covenants and 
binding restrictions would affect managers accounting choices (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner, 1994). We, also, expect that firms in poor financial position face a greater risk of 
violating a debt contract or experiencing a decrease in value, and hence will be more likely 
not to include interest paid in CFOA. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Sweeney (1994) and 
Charitou, Lambertides and Trigeorgis (2011), among others, suggest that firms in financial 
distress have incentives to engage in earnings management. Sweeney (1994), in particular, 
suggests that accounting flexibility is an important determinant of the managers’ accounting 
response to impending financial trouble. We also expect that the firm’s overall financial 
standing is associated with the materiality of the interest payment, as well as the type of the 
debtholder. Private debtholders possess superior information access and processing abilities 
that reduce adverse selection costs (Bharath, Sunder and Sunder, 2008), rendering their 
reliance on debt-covenants as a means to monitor firm management and safeguard their 
interests, less necessary. Conversely, reported accounting numbers are more important to 
external parties with lower access to firm information rendering the incentive to inflate CFO 
stronger, the greater the firm’s proportion of public debt held.9 We, thus, expect that the need 
to avoid debt-covenant violations will be more pronounced when the firm relies more on 
public rather than private debt. Finally, we also expect that the likelihood of debt-covenant 
violation should be related to the firm’s change in leverage between the IFRS and pre-IFRS 
years (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013). Given that before IFRS adoption operating cash 
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 http://simplestudies.com/what-are-debt-covenants.html; http://quickbooks.intuit.com/r/cash-
flow/understanding-loan-covenants/ 
9
 We are thankful to two anonymous reviewers for a number of suggestions that have significantly improved the 
development of the classification choice model.  
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flows were exclusive of interest paid, the change in leverage should capture the incentive to 
inflate CFO for new agreements signed in the IFRS period. We posit that if increased levels 
of leverage reflect a greater likelihood of violating a contractual obligation, greater increases 
in debt should be positively related to the probability of not including interest paid in CFOA. 
Beneish and Press (1993), for example, find that firms which violate debt covenants are more 
leveraged than non-violators, while Ashbaugh, Collins and LaFond (2006) find that firms 
with higher leverage exhibit lower credit ratings. Finally, Reisel (2014) finds that covenants 
of highly leveraged firms are more likely to include restrictions on payouts and additional 
debt. However, it is also possible that increased leverage may instead capture the demand of 
debt holders for more reliable information, and their increased monitoring on firm 
management (Jensen, 1986). Thus, given the literature’s mix results, we do not make a 
prediction on the relation between the change in leverage and classification choice. 
Similarly, the literature has identified a number of market incentives related to the decision to 
manage earnings. Among other reasons firms manage earnings when issuing capital (Teoh, 
Welch and Wong, 1998a and 1998b), or to meet important earnings thresholds such as prior 
year earnings or analyst earnings forecasts (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler and 
Eames, 2006). Consistent with this literature, we expect market incentives to be related to the 
firm’s SCF classification choice. Firstly, we posit that the existence of cash flow forecasts by 
financial analysts may reflect greater firm monitoring on behalf of analysts, weakening the 
incentive to manage financial statements (Yu, 2008) and, similarly, their propensity to inflate 
CFO, by not including interest payments in CFOA. Brown et al. (2013) find, however, that 
firms beating analyst earnings forecasts have larger positive capital market reactions if they 
also beat analyst cash flow forecasts. Thus, the incentive to meet a cash flow forecast may 
actually motivate managers not to include interest paid in CFOA. We also expect that firms 
whose CFO number is lower than operating income will be less likely to include interest 
payments in CFOA. Anecdotal evidence suggests that lower values of this ratio may signal 
the firm’s deteriorating ability to continue funding its activities (Karp, 2011). Finally, we also 
expect the issuance of additional capital to prompt managers to inflate the CFO number. 
Empirical findings suggest that firms making seasoned equity offerings, (SEOs), manage 
their earnings upwards in the quarter before the SEO (e.g. Teoh et al., 1998a).  
Finally, we posit that effective corporate governance mechanisms should mitigate the 
tendency of firms to inflate CFO. Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that one mechanism for 
reducing agency problems and manager opportunistic behavior is the board of directors, and 
13 
 
by extension all other related corporate governance mechanisms, whose role is to monitor and 
discipline management. In general, effective corporate governance mechanisms are 
associated with greater voluntary disclosures, (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) and lower 
earnings management. Klein (2002), for example, suggests that board independence increases 
the ability of the board to effectively monitor managers, while Peasnell, Pope and Young 
(2005) find that the proportion of outsiders on the board reduces the likelihood of managers 
to engage in earnings management. Farber (2005), using a sample of firms that the SEC 
identified as fraudulently manipulating financial statements, found that they exhibit poorer 
governance characteristics relative to a control sample in the year prior to the detection of 
fraud. These include a lower percentage of outside board members, fewer financial experts on 
the audit committee and a smaller percentage of Big-4 auditors. In a similar vein, Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt (2003) find that board’s and audit committee’s composition, expertise 
and meeting frequency are important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to act 
opportunistically. Similarly, research suggests that aggressive earnings management is 
negatively related to the expertise of the audit committee members (Bedard, Chtourou and 
Courteau, 2004), and that higher audit fees capture the increasing importance a firm assigns 
to financial quality (O’Sullivan, 2000; Kim, Liu and Zheng, 2012).10 In this spirit, we argue, 
that firms with strong corporate governance in place should be able to more effectively 
discipline managers, reduce agency costs, and constrain the propensity of the firm to exploit 
the classification choice allowed by IFRS to inflate CFO. Put differently, better governed 
firms are more likely to include interest payments in CFOA to ensure the comparability 
between earnings and operating cash flow, in turn, increasing the quality of financial 
reporting.  
Given the importance of the CFO number on the one hand (Lee, 2012; Wasley and Wu, 2006; 
DeFond and Hung, 2003;), and the related research results on earnings management and 
classification shifting on the other, we propose that similar to the incentives affecting 
earnings management, firm propensity to manage CFOA will also be accentuated by 
contractual and market incentives and mitigated by strong corporate governance.  
2.3 Classification choice and firm value 
                                                          
10
 Even though theory suggests that high audit fees may compromise auditor independence such adverse effect 
is generally not supported by empirical research (Craswell, Stokes and Laughton, 2002). 
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Another important difference between this study and the aforementioned classification 
studies is that the SCF classification choice takes place at a particular point in time, i.e., it 
signifies an identifiable event, which allows us to examine the association between this 
presentation choice and firm value. Specifically, we expect that the choice not to classify 
interest payments in CFOA should be related to lower firm values. We base this expectation 
on two inter-related arguments. First, we argue that the decision not to include interest 
payments in CFOA is associated with lower disclosure quality.  This stems from the fact that 
such choice reduces the comparability between earnings and cash flows from operations 
allowing market participants to construe that the firm’s earnings are of lower quality. 
Sengupta (1998) argues that firms making informative disclosures are perceived to have a 
lower likelihood of withholding value-relevant information, and as a result these firms are 
charged a lower risk premium. Related evidence in the literature suggests that the risk that 
financial information is of poor quality, is a non-diversifiable risk factor, and hence priced by 
the market (Easley and O’Hara, 2004). Similarly, earlier theoretical research in accounting 
suggests that increased disclosure reduces the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrechhia, 1991; 
Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). In a similar vein, Francis, LaFond, Ohlsson and 
Schipper (2005) find that lower accrual quality, their proxy for earnings management, is 
associated with higher costs of equity and debt.  Similarly, Gaio, and Raposo (2011), using a 
large international sample from 38 countries, document that their aggregate earnings quality 
measure is positively related to firm valuations. In this spirit, we argue that not classifying 
interest paid in CFOA should similarly indicate greater information asymmetry, increasing 
the premium required by investors to hold the stock, and decreasing, in turn, firm value. In 
essence, even though the classification choice is visible, it helps the market better assess the 
firm’s disclosure quality and hence the level of information risk investors are assuming.  
Secondly, we argue that, given the stickiness of the classification choice (see also footnotes 2 
and 21), a firm that commits to including interest payments in CFOA signals to the market 
that it is a high value firm. Conversely, a firm that chooses not to include interest payments in 
CFOA similarly conveys information about weaker future performance. We base this 
argument on related arguments in the cross-listing and voluntary disclosure literatures. For 
example, Pagano, Röell and Zechner, (2002), and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, (2004), among 
others, argue that firms cross-list in stricter legal environments to reveal to the market that the 
firm is a high quality firm.  Doidge et al. (2004) also acknowledge that in the presence of 
information asymmetry firms can commit to enhanced disclosure as a means of conveying to 
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shareholders that the firm is of high-value. Karamanou and Nishiotis (2009) examine this 
question, in particular, and find that firms which voluntarily adopt IAS do so as a signal of 
the firm’s positive future performance. This is because committing to high standards of 
disclosure or the legal environment restrains the ability of firms to manipulate financial 
information in case their future performance is weak. In the same way, we argue that a firm 
that cannot commit to including interest payments in CFOA signals to the market that high 
future financial performance cannot be assured.  
One obvious question that arises in this case is why would a manager inflate the CFO number 
if the market is able to see through this attempt. Unlike earnings management studies that 
entail an element of improper manipulation and change in measurement, the classification 
choice allowed by IFRS cannot hold a manager liable for misreporting. Thus, managers can 
exploit the choice allowed by IFRS in an attempt to either meet contractual terms and/or 
mislead the market, knowing that there are no reputation or litigation costs involved with 
such choice in case the market is not fooled. Related research has shown that the market is 
not misled by earnings management around IPOs (Fan, 2007), or SEOs (Shivakumar, 2000). 
More importantly, if the underlying reason for CFO management is to influence contractual 
outcomes, the ability of the market to see through the manipulation may be of less importance 
to firm management who perceives the benefit of not violating a debt covenant more 
important than the possible negative association with market value. 
Even though we expect that firms choosing not to include interest paid in CFOA are 
motivated by opportunistic reasons, it is still possible, however, that the CFFA choice is not 
perceived by the market as negatively affecting firm value. This can arise in case the market 
is misled by the choice not to include interest paid in CFOA, possibly due to investor fixation 
on the CFO figure. Investor myopia is to some extent assumed by earnings management 
studies but more specifically it is allured to by research documenting the failure of the market 
to adjust for the difference in persistence between the cash flow and accrual components of 
earnings, (Sloan, 1996; Dechow, Richardson and Sloan, 2008). Admittedly, such myopic 
behavior may be less evident in the case of cash flow classification choice where shifting is 
more easily discernible.  
The fact that the classification choice provides an identifiable event, i.e., a point in time 
where firms make the relevant decision, allows us to better link the presentation choice to 
firm value. Related studies examining other classification changes are hampered by the fact 
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that they cannot pinpoint the first time the misrepresentation took place and are, therefore, 
unable to directly examine the effects of this event on firm value. We are, thus, able to extend 
related research not only by examining the propensity of managers to engage in financial 
statement presentation management but to also link this choice to firm value, and to changes 
thereof.  
3. Research design 
The aim of this study is twofold: First, we investigate whether the classification choice of 
interest paid on the SCF can be explained by the firm’s contractual and market incentives and 
mitigated by strong corporate governance. Second, we examine whether the firm’s 
classification choice is related to market valuation.  
  
3.1 Classification choice and firm incentives  
To examine the factors associated with the decision not to include interest paid in CFOA and 
classify it in CFFA, we run the following logistic model:  
DCFFA= a0 + Ʃ aj* Firm Contractual Incentives + Ʃ ai * Firm Market Incentives + Ʃ ak* 
Corporate Governance Characteristics + Ʃ al * Controls                                                (1) 
DCFFA takes the value 1 if the firm chooses not to include interest payments in CFOA by 
choosing the CFFA category, and the value 0 if  interest paid is included in CFOA.   
We capture the firm’s contractual incentives, and hence the likelihood of covenant violation, 
with the following variables: DLOSS takes the value 1 if net income for the year is negative, 
and 0 otherwise. Altman reflects the value of the Altman’s Z-score, with lower values 
indicating a higher probability of default (Altman, 1968).
11
 ΔLEV, is the change in leverage 
computed as the change in the ratio of total debt to total assets between the IFRS and pre-
IFRS years. Binding takes the value 1 if the firm faces binding covenants in the year of the 
switch, and 0 otherwise. Following DeAngelo et al. (1994), we use annual report disclosures 
and assume that the firm faces a binding covenant if at least one of the following conditions 
is met: (a) end of period unrestricted retained earnings are zero, (b) unrestricted retained 
earnings plus cash dividends paid in the current year are less than cash dividends paid in the 
prior year, (c) annual disclosures state that the firm is unable to pay dividends due to binding 
                                                          
11
 Our results are unchanged if the Altman Z score is replaced by an indicator variable based on the cutoff point 
of 2.675 as commonly used in the literature, or even when we use a more conservative threshold of 1.81.   
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covenants, and (d) the firm has restricted cash. Public_debt%, captures the reliance of the 
firm on debt held by the public and it is measured as the ratio of bonds payable plus 
preference shares (if these are classified as liabilities) to total long-term liabilities. CFO_COV 
is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has debt covenants relating to 
operating cash flow in the year of the switch and 0 otherwise. This information is obtained 
from the firm’s annual report disclosures. Finally, the model controls for Materiality, 
computed by dividing the amount of interest paid (irrespective of where it is classified) by 
operating cash flows gross of any interest payments or receipts (i.e., before interest paid is 
subtracted and interest received is added). Thus, this variable captures the potential impact 
interest paid would have had on operating cash flows if it were included in the CFOA 
category.  
Our second set of variables captures firm incentives to influence investors and information 
intermediaries (Walker, 2013). CFO_FOR takes the value 1 when there is at least one cash 
flow forecast for the year of the IFRS switch. The existence of cash flow forecasts can either 
reflect a greater ability of analysts to monitor firms or motivate managers to inflate the CFO 
number in an attempt to meet or beat the CFO target. To control for the incentive to meet a 
cash flow forecast the model includes DMEET that takes the value 1 if during the switch year 
the firm met or beat at least one CFO forecast, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, DMEET can only 
take the value 1 if CFO_FOR equals 1. When both variables are included in the model, the 
coefficient on CFO_FOR captures the valuation effect of having at least one cash-flow 
forecast which is not met by CFO compared to the base case of not having any analyst cash-
flow forecasts. The coefficient on DMEET, therefore, captures the incremental effect on firm 
value associated with having at least one cash-flow forecast that is met or beat by the firm’s 
actual CFO. To capture the incentive to inflate CFO when it is lower than operating income, 
the model includes CFO/OI, measured as cash flows from operations before interest paid 
divided by the company’s operating profit. Finally, we control for the market incentive to 
manage accounting numbers around SEOs, the classification model also includes DSEO, an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm makes a SEO in the year of the switch, and 
0 otherwise. 
Our third set of variables captures the strength of the firm’s corporate governance. Following 
Farber (2005) and other related literature, our model includes a number of corporate 
governance mechanisms that are expected to affect the quality of firm disclosures. The model 
includes board independence, B_IND, computed as the percentage of independent directors 
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on the company’s board of directors, and the presence of an accounting expert on the board’s 
audit committee, Acc_Exp (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). The model also includes two 
proxies for the effectiveness of the company’s auditor, another important driver of disclosure 
quality. The first variable, Auditor, takes the value 1 if the company is audited by a Big4 
audit firm and 0 otherwise. Our second variable, Audit_Fees, is the amount of fees paid to the 
auditor for the audit of the firm scaled by total assets. Finally, our model includes the natural 
logarithm of board size, BS, but we do not make an explicit prediction on its relation with the 
classification choice variable as on the one hand, smaller boards may lack adequate 
knowledge or management skills, but on the other hand, larger boards may be less effective.  
Finally, the model includes fixed industry effects and it controls for size, SIZE, measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets, and the firm’s profitability captured by return on assets, 
ROA.  
3.2 Classification choice and firm value 
We next examine whether the firm’s classification choice is associated with its market 
valuation, as captured by Tobin’s q, TQ. Tobin’s q is computed as market value of equity, 
plus total liabilities divided by total assets, as measured at the end of the switch year, denoted 
as year t. In section 5, we report results when TQ is measured at t+1, i.e., in the year 
following the switch and year t-1.  To examine whether the classification choice is linked to 
firm value we estimate the following regression: 
TQ= β0 + β1* DCFFA + Ʃ βi* Controls + e                                 (2) 
The firm’s value, however, may be affected by the endogenous nature of the classification 
decision. This would introduce correlation between the explanatory variables and the 
disturbance term in Equation (2) and as a result, OLS estimates of β1 will not be consistent. 
Following Greene (1997), we address this issue of self-selection bias using the Heckman 
(1979) correction which is based on the estimation of Equation (1) as the first step in a two-
step estimation procedure. The second step is the following corrected valuation equation:  
TQ= δ0 + δ1* DCFFA + Ʃ δi* Controls + δ3* λ + η    (3) 
where λ is the Inverse Mills ratio and is estimated using all variables from Equation (1) and 
including all the additional variables of the valuation model.  
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As explained in Section 2.3 above, if choosing CFFA instead of CFOA is indicative of lower 
disclosure quality or conveys a negative signal regarding the firm’s future performance, the 
relation between the choice of CFFA and firm value should be negative. The relation, 
however, will be non-negative if investors fixate on the CFO number and are misled by the 
presentation choice.  
Equation (3) controls for other firm characteristics that are expected to be related to firm 
value. As firm value is affected both by future expected cash flows and the company’s cost of 
capital, our control variables capture either or both of these effects. More specifically, the 
valuation model includes sales growth, Salesgr, and Industry q, IND_Q, as proxies for growth 
opportunities. Doidge et al. (2004) document a positive relation between firm value and 
growth. Salesgr is computed as the percentage change in sales between year t, i.e., the 
adoption year, and year t-1. IND_Q is the median Tobin’s q of all firms in the same industry. 
The model also includes return on assets, ROA, as higher profitability should be related to 
higher future cash flows.  
The model also controls for both changes in leverage, ΔLEV, and the level of the firm’s 
leverage, LEV, as for valuation purposes both the level and change in leverage can be 
important indicators of firm value. In addition, just as the relation of firm leverage with 
accounting choice is ambiguous, its relation to firm value cannot a priori be determined. On 
the one hand, leverage may capture increased uncertainty that should positively affect the 
firm’s cost of capital, in turn, reducing firm value (Opler and Titman, 1994). On the other 
hand, higher values of leverage may discipline management by reducing free cash flow or by 
increasing management monitoring through the imposed debt covenants, increasing firm 
value (Jensen, 1986; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Ashbaugh et al., 2006). Given the ambiguity 
regarding the effect of leverage on firm value we also include in the model Altman, Binding, 
Materiality and CFO_COV to better capture the effect of financial difficulties on the firm’s 
cost of capital and its ability to generate future cash flows.   
We capture the firm’s disclosure quality with four variables: CL is an indicator variable of 
whether the firm is cross-listed on a US stock exchange, and FOLL, is the natural logarithm 
of the firm’s analyst following. CL should be positively related to firm value as it reflects the 
firm’s commitment to a more demanding legal environment, decreasing the cost of capital 
and increasing the future cash flows as cross-listing enables firms to better attain the growth 
opportunities (Doidge et al., 2004). FOLL is also expected to be positively related to TQ as it 
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reflects higher disclosure quality (Lang and Lundholm, 1996), and hence lower firm 
uncertainty (Karamanou and Nishiotis, 2009). The model also includes Auditor, a variable 
that captures the quality of firm provided information (Titman and Trueman, 1986). Finally, 
the model also includes CFO_FOR to capture the monitoring role of analysts. DeFond and 
Hung (2003) show that analysts’ probability to issue cash flow forecasts in addition to 
earnings forecasts is greater when CFO is more useful to market participants in interpreting 
earnings and valuing securities returns. Auditor and CFO_FOR are as defined in equation (1) 
above.  
Additionally, to control for the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting measurement we 
include in the model, ΔROA04, which is computed as the difference in ROA for the year 2004 
as restated to IFRS in the comparative figures of the firm’s first annual report under IFRS and 
the ROA value as originally reported in the 2004 annual report. Even though UK GAAP is 
similar to IFRS, the fact that the switch takes place in a country with strong legal 
enforcement where all the IFRS benefits seem to accrue, suggests that the new accounting 
regime should increase disclosure quality, at least, incrementally. Empirical results confirm 
this expectation. Horton and Serafeim (2010) find that the IFRS reconciliation of UK GAAP 
accounting numbers is not information free and that earnings adjustments are value relevant 
while Christensen, Lee and Walker (2009) suggest that earnings reconciliations from UK 
GAAP to IFRS contain new information that investors consider relevant for firm valuation 
and which managers opportunistically delay its release, if unfavorable. In a similar vein, 
Christensen et al. (2007) document that the benefit of IFRS adoption varies significantly 
across UK firms. It is, therefore, likely that the new accounting regime will induce changes in 
accounting measurement and in turn, affect firm value as the impact of IFRS adoption may be 
indicative of the firm’s disclosure culture. 12 Finally, the model controls for SIZE, and the 
firm’s capital intensity, PPE. PPE is measured as the ratio of property plant and equipment to 
total sales and it captures the relative importance of fixed capital in the firm’s output and as 
such it should be negatively related to Tobin’s q (Klapper and Love, 2004). 
An important issue in models correcting for self-selection bias, like the Heckman (1979) 
approach we use, is the choice of instruments in the selection equation (classification 
decision) which should not be expected to affect firm value, i.e., our observation model, 
                                                          
12
 Throughout this study we refer to the fiscal year prior to the switch as year 2004 and the year of the switch as 
2005, even though for firms with fiscal years ending in any month other than December the first year of (prior 
to) the switch actually occurs in 2006 (2005). 
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(Greene, 1997), but be correlated to the regressor for which they are to serve as instruments 
(Wooldridge, 2002).
13
 We assume that variables which capture the firm’s reporting culture, 
such as the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee, Acc_Exp, and the amount 
of audit fees, Audit_Fees, should be able to explain the classification choice, but should not 
be related to firm value. Unlike other corporate governance variables that capture the board’s 
overall operating effectiveness, or financial characteristics that should affect both the firm’s 
cost of capital and/or future expected cash flows, and hence firm value, audit fees, and audit 
committee expertise should not have a direct impact on firm value. Consistent with this 
conjecture, Brown and Caylor (2006) find that only seven out of 51 governance measures are 
related to firm value, none of which relates to disclosure effectiveness, while Ashbaugh, et al. 
(2006) find that firm value is not related to either audit committee expertise nor to fees paid 
to auditors. Similarly, prior literature fails to find a relation between board independence and 
board size with firm performance. Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) find no significant association between the percentage of outsiders on the board and 
same-year measures of corporate performance, while Bhagat and Black (2000) find no 
relation between overall board independence and Tobin’s Q measured over a 3-year window. 
Klein (1998) finds no association between firm performance and overall board composition, 
as well as between the level of independence on audit, compensation and nominating 
committees, and firm performance. From the contractual incentives of Equation (1), we 
assume that Public_Debt%, and DLOSS should not exhibit any incremental information 
content over the firm’s leverage and profitability, that are already included in the valuation 
model and thus we treat them as instruments.   Similarly, we do not expect DSEO, CFO/OI 
and DMEET to be related to firm value and are, thus, treated as instruments.
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Understandably, the selection of instruments can significantly affect inferences. In 
untabulated analyses, we check the robustness of our results by dropping the assumption that 
(a) ACC_EXP, and Audit_Fees, (b) Public_Debt%, DLOSS, CFO/OI and DMEET, (c) B_IND 
and BS, are appropriate instruments, without any significant change in results.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
                                                          
13
 There is a wide concern in the accounting literature with regards to the selection of best instrumental 
variables. We have tried to justify theoretically and empirically the selection of our instruments, however, we 
acknowledge that the exclusion restriction is always an important issue for the validity of the tests and 
inferences. 
14
 In untabulated tests we rerun our analysis by removing all interacted variables from the first stage model. 
These alternative specifications do not affect our main inferences. 
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Our initial dataset consists of all non-financial firms included on the FTSE UK 350 index in 
July 2006. We obtain company annual reports from Thomson One for both the year of the 
switch to IFRS and for the prior year. Of these, 257 firms have available annual reports which 
also clearly indicate the classification of interest paid on the statement of cash flows.
15
 From 
the annual reports we also manually collect information regarding the firm’s auditor, audit 
fees and other corporate governance variables. We then match these firms to Datastream to 
obtain financial information. Data requirements for the logistic model reduce the sample to 
229 observations and additional data requirements for the main valuation model to 224.  
Table 1 presents mean and median values for the variables used in the models separately for 
firms which classify interest paid in CFFA versus CFOA. From our classification sample of 
229 firms only about one third elect not to classify interest paid in CFFA (N=74) with the 
majority of firms (N=155) selecting to present this cash outflow in CFOA instead. This 
evidence is interesting in and of itself as it is consistent with our conjecture that the most 
natural category for this item is CFOA, leaving open the question of whether firms that 
choose not to do so are exploiting the discretion under IFRS in response to contractual or 
market incentives. The Table presents the difference in the mean (median) values across the 
two sub-samples along with t-tests (Wilcoxon tests) for the significance of the differences. In 
panel A, we present the statistics for the variables in the classification model. In general, the 
evidence suggests that the two groups do not exhibit significant differences for most of the 
explanatory variables with the only notable differences related to board size, ΔLEV, and 
Public_debt%, suggesting that CFFA firms have larger boards, but that they also exhibit 
greater increases in leverage at the year of the switch and are more exposed to public 
financing. Panel B presents the analysis for the additional variables included in the valuation 
model. Again, the two groups do not exhibit any significant differences in the additional 
explanatory variables of the model. However, differences in medians provide some evidence 
that CFFA firms exhibit higher valuations in the adoption year and that they are followed by 
more analysts.  
Table 2 presents variable correlations. Panel A presents the correlations between the variables 
in the classification choice model, while panel B presents those of the valuation model. 
Except for the positive and significant correlation of DCFFA with board size, BS, change in 
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 After excluding financial firms from the initial sample, we have missing data for a total of 67 non-financial 
firms. For 40 of these firms the annual report is not available and for the remaining 27 the statement of cash 
flows does not include interest paid.  
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leverage, ΔLEV, and the percentage of public debt, Public_debt%, none of the other variables 
of Equation (1) are significantly correlated with DCFFA, consistent with the descriptive 
evidence presented in Table 1. According to the results presented in panel B, DCFFA does 
not exhibit any significant correlations neither with the valuation variables nor the additional 
control variables of the valuation model.
16
 TQ is positively correlated with IND_Q and ROA 
and negatively correlated with PPE, SIZE, and Materiality. Thus, firms with higher growth 
opportunities and profitability, smaller firms and firms with smaller capital intensity and 
material interest payments exhibit higher valuations.  In general, the evidence presented in 
both Tables 1 and 2 fails to indicate that CFFA firms differ in significant ways from their 
CFOA counterparts. This is interesting in and of itself, as it suggests that based on most 
company characteristics a simple univariate analysis cannot help distinguish between the two 
types of firms. We examine whether a multivariable setting can better help explain the 
classification choice in the next section.  
4.2 Explaining the classification choice 
Results of Equation (1) are presented in Table 3. The first model separately examines the 
relation between contractual incentives and firm presentation choices while market incentives 
are examined in the second model. The third model examines the effect of corporate 
governance characteristics. The last model in Table 3 is the full model that includes all 
incentives along with the variables representing corporate governance characteristics.  
Overall, our evidence suggests a positive association between contractual incentives and the 
likelihood of firms inflating CFO. Specifically, the likelihood of not including interest paid in 
CFOA, (DCFFA=1) is positively related to firms reporting accounting losses, as indicated by 
the significantly positive coefficient on DLOSS. Findings show a significant positive relation 
between DCFFA and changes in leverage at the year of the switch, as suggested by the 
positive and significant coefficient on ΔLEV. Additionally, the composition of long-term debt 
seems to be associated with managers’ classification choice. More specifically, firms with a 
higher percentage of public debt have stronger incentives to inflate CFO, as suggested by the 
positive and significant coefficient on Public_Debt%. Even though the materiality of interest 
paid does not seem to explain the classification choice in the full model, model 1 of Table 3 
suggests that materiality affects classification choice when firms are subject to binding debt 
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 Given that some variables are included in both the classification choice and valuation models their 
correlations are shown in both panels for completeness. Some minor differences exist between the two panels 
due to the slightly smaller sample size of the valuation model.  
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covenants.
17
 Finally, the existence of CFO-related covenants is associated with lower 
likelihood of including interest payments in CFOA but this relation is weaker for firms with 
lower probability of default, (reflected in higher values of the Altman score). Given that both 
Public_Debt% and ΔLEV remain positive and significant in model 4 of Table 3 and based on 
the evidence in Bradley and Roberts (2004) which suggests that the likelihood of having 
covenants in public debt issues is increasing with the firm’s leverage, we conclude that 
contractual incentives are significantly associated with the firm’s classification choice. 
Specifically, our evidence suggests that the incentive to influence contractual outcomes is 
related to an increased probability of classifying interest payments in the CFFA rather than 
the CFOA category of the statement of cash flows. These results are consistent with extant 
research which suggests that firm reporting incentives are stronger when the firm is in poor 
financial condition (Lee, 2012; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013) and confirm expectations 
that managers’ accounting and reporting choices are at least to some extent related to 
incentives to reduce the likelihood of debt covenant violations (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986).  
With respect to market incentives, (model 2 of Table 3), we find that the strongest incentives 
are those which relate to analyst cash flow forecasts. Specifically, the coefficient on 
CFO_FOR is negative while the coefficient on DMEET is positive. Together this evidence 
suggests that the existence of CFO forecasts is associated with greater probability of 
classifying interest paid in the CFOA section of the SCF. However, when managers face 
strong incentives to meet or beat these thresholds they are less likely to have classified 
interest paid in CFOA, consistent with research showing that firms manage earnings to meet 
or beat analyst earnings forecasts.
18
 
Finally, our evidence presented in model 3 of Table 3 also suggests that firms with more 
effective corporate governance mechanisms in place, captured by the presence of an 
accounting expert on the audit committee and higher audit fees, are also associated with 
greater likelihood of classifying interest paid in CFOA as evidenced by the negative and 
significant coefficients on both of these variables. This evidence suggests that firms which 
                                                          
17
 In untabulated results we find that the choice to classify interest received in CFOA does not explain the 
classification choice of interest paid. We also find that the amount of interest received is significantly lower 
than the amount of interest paid. This implies that the impact of interest received on the firm’s cash flow is 
minimal and should not be expected to affect the reporting incentives associated with the classification of 
interest payments.  
18
 DMEET is set to 0 if analysts do not make CFO forecasts. If we drop this assumption the number of 
observations is reduced substantially but results remain qualitatively the same. 
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place a greater importance on disclosure quality, and hence exhibit lower information risk, 
are less likely to include interest paid in CFFA. This result suggests that better governed 
firms are more likely to include interest paid in CFOA to ensure the comparability of 
earnings and operating cash flows, increasing, in turn, the quality of financial reporting. We 
also find that the size of the firm’s board of directors is positively related to the choice of 
CFFA as the disclosure medium, consistent with related research documenting that larger 
boards are less effective. Overall, this evidence suggests that firms with a strong governance 
structure, as it especially relates to financial information, are able to reduce agency costs and 
enhance firm disclosure quality by more effectively disciplining and monitoring managers.  
4.3 Examining the effects of the classification choice on firm value 
Table 4 presents results on the association between classification choice with firm value. 
These results are obtained after correcting for self-selection bias, in essence, alleviating 
concerns that the valuation difference observed is based on a non-random assignment of the 
sample firms to the two groups that is correlated with DCFFA. The model used to correct for 
endogeneity is presented in panel B and it includes all variables of the full model used to 
explain the classification choice (i.e., model 4 of Table 3) along with the additional variables 
in the valuation model. Excluding the additional valuation model variables in the first stage 
does not change the interpretation of results.  
The first column of Table 4 presents the valuation model when the dependent variable is TQ 
and the second when the dependent variable is ΔΤQt. Overall, results in the first model of 
Table 4 indicate that firms classifying interest paid in the financing section of the cash flow 
statement exhibit significantly lower valuations than firms presenting interest paid in CFOA, 
as evidenced by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on DCFFA. These results 
suggest that the market perceives this choice as indicative of poor future firm performance 
and/or lower disclosure quality. The inverse Mills ratio, λ, in Table 4 is negative and 
significant, which suggests that both endogeneity is present in our research setting and that 
the instruments of the first stage model aid in mitigating the resulting bias (Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010).
19
 The negative coefficient on λ in particular, suggests that the unobserved 
factors that make the selection of CFFA more likely tend to be associated with lower 
valuations.  
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 The model’s partial R2 of 14.85% and the Wald Chi-square of 26.8344 provide further evidence that the 
instruments used are not weak.  
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Turning to the rest of the control variables we find that firm profitability, ROA, is associated 
with higher valuations in line with higher ROA reflecting higher future cash flow 
expectations. Growth opportunities, as captured by IND_Q, are positively associated with 
firm value, consistent with the results of Doidge et al., (2004). We also find evidence that 
firms with material interest payments have lower valuations, as suggested by the significantly 
negative coefficient of Materiality. CFO_COV exhibits a negative coefficient, while this 
relation is weaker for firms with lower probability of default, (reflected in higher values of 
the Altman score). This finding is consistent with prior literature showing that the cost of debt 
covenant violation is impounded in lower shareholder wealth (Beneish and Press, 1995). Size 
is negatively related to firm value, consistent with the well-known small firm premium. The 
impact of IFRS adoption on financial statement measurement as captured by ΔROA04 does not 
affect firm value, suggesting that the effect of DCFFA on firm value is not influenced by the 
overall impact of the IFRS switch on the firm’s reporting environment. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, we find a negative and significant coefficient on Altman, indicating that firms 
with higher probability of default actually exhibit higher valuations. Given the high 
correlation between Altman and ΔLEV of -0.148 as shown in panel B of Table 2, we posit that 
lower levels of Altman may capture a greater ability of debtholders to monitor managers 
reducing conflicts of interests and increasing in turn firm value.   
An alternative method of correcting for the endogenous relation between firm value and the 
firm’s classification choice on the statement of cash flows is to employ a changes 
specification which is less likely to be affected by endogeneity or omitted correlated variables 
even though documenting significant relations in a changes specification is generally more 
difficult.
20
 The second column of Table 4 presents results when the dependent variable is 
ΔTQ, measured as the percentage change in Tobin’s q at the end of the first financial year 
under IFRS reporting and the prior year. All explanatory variables, including DCFFA, are 
measured at the end of year t.
 21
 Results indicate that even in this specification, DCFFA is 
significantly and negatively related to changes in firm value. Thus, the choice allowed under 
IFRS to classify interest paid in the financing rather than the operating cash flow section of 
                                                          
20
 The Heckman bias correction, λ, is significant at the 10% level suggesting that endogeneity is less of a 
concern in this specification.  
21 Linking changes in classification choice to changes in firm value would provide further support for our 
results. However, as the IASB notes, presentation choices on the SCF should be consistently applied. 
Nevertheless, we test this assertion by examining the classification category of interest paid on the SCF for 
thirty firms selected randomly from our initial sample. Unsurprisingly, their 2009 annual reports indicate that all 
thirty firms continue to report interest paid in the same section as they did back in 2005. This precludes the 
identification of a big enough sample to perform such analysis. 
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the statement of cash flows is associated with lower valuations. We interpret this result as 
being consistent with the classification choice reflecting higher information asymmetry 
and/or weaker future firm performance. This result is consistent with the evidence in Charitou 
et al. (2014) who find that IFRS adoption induces some firms to reveal their bad type. 
Interestingly, only one variable in this model is significant in this specification, in addition to 
DCFFA. Results show that ΔLEV is positively related to changes in firm value around the 
IFRS adoption event. This suggests that firms with increased levels of leverage benefit more 
from the classification choice allowed by IFRS possibly due to the ability of debtholders to 
better monitor firm management in enhanced disclosure environments.  
5. Robustness Analyses 
5.1 Reporting quality 
In this section we address the concern that our inferences are affected by the firm’s overall 
reporting quality which might be correlated with the firm’s classification choice and in turn, 
its valuation. If this is the case, our classification choice model may not adequately control 
for the firm’s reporting quality level, affecting our ability to explain this choice, and in turn, 
impairing our ability to disentangle the effect of the presentation choice from the effect of 
accounting quality on firm value.  
Panel A of Table 5 examines the sensitivity of our classification choice results by including 
in the full model (model 4) of Table 3, proxies for reporting quality.  In the first model of 
panel A, we add in the model the variable ΔROA04 that captures the measurement impact of 
IFRS adoption on the firm’s net income. Under the assumption that firms with greater 
reporting quality will also exhibit smaller differences between the IFRS and UK GAAP 
amounts, this variable captures the firm’s commitment to reporting quality. In the next three 
models of Table 5 we, more directly, measure reporting quality by including in the choice 
model proxies of earnings management computed in year t, i.e., the year of the IFRS switch. 
We first compute discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney, 1995). The model’s residual captures the part of accruals that cannot be 
explained by the firm’s operating activities, with higher levels of this measure reflecting 
attempts to increase earnings. Our second measure of reporting quality is based on the 
variability of the change in net income deflated by total assets over the five-year period prior 
to the adoption of IFRS. Related research suggests that if earnings are smoothed they should 
be less variable (Lang, Raedy and Yetman, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003). Our third measure or 
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earnings quality is based on the tendency of firms to report small positive earnings. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) present evidence that firms use accounting discretion to avoid 
reporting small losses. We follow their measure and classify firms whose net income divided 
by total assets falls in the range of [0 to 0.01] as reporting small positive earnings. If the IFRS 
earnings of the firm fall in this range, then SPOS takes the value 1, and the value 0 otherwise.  
Results suggest that our main inferences regarding the factors that are related to the 
classification choice of interest paid on the SCF are unaffected by the inclusion of proxies for 
reporting quality. Specifically, even though none of the four accounting quality metrics is 
significantly related to the classification choice, results regarding the other variables of the 
model are qualitatively unchanged. We continue to find that contractual and market 
incentives are positively related to the propensity of firms to manage CFO as evidenced by 
the positive coefficients on ΔLEV, DLOSS, Public_Debt% and DMEET, while strong 
corporate governance mitigates this tendency, as evidenced by the negative coefficients on 
financial expertise and audit fees.  The latter result in particular, suggests that Acc_Exp and 
Audit_Fees are able to capture the level of reporting quality adequately, so that the additional 
earnings quality measures do not have any incremental information content.  
To address concerns that the classification variable captures overall accounting quality, in 
turn affecting our inferences regarding the effect of DCFFA on firm value, we rerun all 
valuation models including the accounting quality variables. Panels B and C of Table 5 
exhibit results when in the valuation model of Table 4 we add the three earnings management 
proxies. In panel B the dependent variable is TQ and in Panel C, ΔTQ. In all models, DCFFA 
continues to be significantly and negatively related to TQ and ΔTQ after controlling for 
different measures of earnings quality. The only exception is model 2 of panel C where 
DCFFA is negative but with a significance level of 0.15. Interestingly, inferences regarding 
the rest of the control variables are largely unaffected by the inclusion of the reporting quality 
variables. Together these results suggest that not only our inferences are unaffected by the 
inclusion of the additional variables but more importantly that the relation between 
classification choice and the change in firm value is not subsumed by the firm’s earnings 
quality.  
5.2 Tobin’s Q measurement date  
Measuring TQ at the end of the financial year is based on the presumption that the market is 
aware of the classification choice before the firm releases its annual report. We, thus, 
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examine the sensitivity of our results to this assumption by linking DCFFA to firm value 
measured at the end of year t+1, i.e., the year during which the annual report of the switch 
year, t, is released. Results are presented in the first column of Table 6. For this model all 
financial variables are measured at the end of year t+1. We continue to find a negative and 
significant association between DCFFA and firm value while untabulated results suggest that 
the difference in the coefficient values between the two periods is not statistically significant. 
We corroborate this finding by randomly selecting 30 firms from our initial sample and 
examining whether their interim, i.e., semi-annual financial statements released during the 
IFRS adoption year include their classification choice. We are able to find interim reports for 
27 firms and for all of these the classification of interest paid is in the same section as the one 
in the forthcoming annual report. These results suggest that not only the market is aware of 
the classification choice at the end of the first IFRS financial year but that the valuation 
association with this choice persists for at least one year after, providing further evidence that 
the presentation choice of interest paid is strongly negatively associated to the firm’s future 
prospects.  
Finally, to provide further assurance that the valuation effects we document are indeed related 
to the classification choice and are not driven by factors not adequately controlled for in the 
analysis, we perform the valuation test for the year before the switch, TQt-1. We argue that if 
the documented relation between DCFFA and TQ is not related to the classification choice 
but it is rather either affected by omitted correlated variables, or driven by information 
embedded in the classification choice but already known by the market and priced, then it 
would also hold for the year before the IFRS switch. Model 2 of Table 6 presents the 
valuation results when the dependent variable is TQt-1 and the independent variables are 
measured at year t-1. Results show that DCFFA and firm value are not related in the year 
before the IFRS switch. We conclude that classification choice of interest paid after the IFRS 
adoption reflects value relevant information. 
6. Conclusions 
We use the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU to investigate whether firm reporting 
incentives that arise from the attempt to affect contractual or market outcomes can explain 
financial statement classification choice. Specifically, we examine whether UK firms take 
advantage of the classification choice of interest paid on the statement of cash flows. Unlike 
the very rigid format of the respective statement under UK GAAP, IFRS allow the 
30 
 
presentation of interest paid in any of the three sections of the cash flow statement. Even if 
the standards allow for management discretion in the classification choice of interest paid, 
most firms choose to present this amount in the CFOA section consistent with the ‘inclusion 
concept’, i.e., as the IASB admits, “because it enters into the determination of profit and 
loss”. Given that CFO is an important measure of firm performance, we predict that firms 
facing incentives to inflate their cash flows from operating activities will be less likely to 
classify interest paid in the cash flows from operating activities section of the statement. 
Consistent with this, we find that the propensity to classify interest paid in CFFA instead 
increases when firms report losses, when a greater proportion of debt stems from public 
sources, when they face CFO-based debt covenants and when they exhibit greater increases 
in leverage in the year of the switch. Results also suggest that the incentive to meet or beat 
analyst CFO forecasts is also positively related to firms’ decision not to classify interest paid 
in CFOA. Finally, we find that firms with an accounting expert on the audit committee and 
firms with higher relative audit fees are associated with a lower likelihood of inflating CFO. 
Overall, these results suggest that contractual and market incentives are related to a higher 
likelihood of reporting interest paid in CFFA, but a firm’s culture that strongly supports 
disclosure quality deters firms from doing so. 
We next examine whether classification choice is associated with market valuations by 
testing its relation with Tobin’s q, a common proxy of firm value. Specifically, we expect that 
firms choosing not to classify interest payments in CFOA will exhibit lower valuations. We 
base this expectation on two related streams of research. The first, suggests that lower 
disclosure quality, captures greater information asymmetry and, thus, it is related to lower 
firm values. Under the assumption that the choice not to include interest payments in CFOA 
reduces the comparability between earnings and CFO, this choice should also reflect lower 
overall disclosure quality, and hence result in lower firm values. The second suggests that the 
choice captures the firm’s unwillingness to commit to the inclusion of interest payments in 
CFOA, thus, serving as a signal of weak future financial performance. In such case, the 
choice of CFFA should be negatively associated with TQ. Overall our evidence confirms this 
expectation as we document lower firm values for firms choosing not to disclose interest paid 
in the operating section of the statement of cash flows. Our results are obtained after 
correcting for self-selection and after the inclusion of a number of other explanatory variables 
that should affect firm value. We corroborate this evidence by examining the relation 
between the classification choice and the change in firm value around the IFRS switch. We 
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document a negative relation between the change in Tobin’s q and the choice of classifying 
interest paid in the financing section of the statement of cash flows, providing further support 
for our results. Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to a number of additional 
tests. First, controlling for the firm’s earnings quality does not affect the results of either the 
classification choice or the valuation models. Second, our results are not changed if TQ is 
measured at the end of t+1, while we fail to document a relation between the classification 
choice and firm value measured at t-1, precluding the possibility that results are affected by 
other confounding factors.  
Taken together our results suggest that presentation choices can be related to important firm 
reporting incentives and that, in turn, are value relevant to the market. We are, thus, able to 
contribute to the literature on earnings management by showing that reporting incentives also 
affect management’s presentation choices. By associating the firm’s classification choice to 
market valuations we are also able to provide empirical evidence on the regulators’ assertion 
that financial statement presentation can be informative to investors. We also contribute to 
the relatively new but growing literature that examines the informativeness of cash flows 
from operations and the limited literature examining financial statement presentation choices. 
Our evidence should also be of interest to academics and regulators as they still strive to 
assert the impact of the mandatory IFRS switch in a number of countries across the world.  
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TABLE 1:  Mean and Median differences 
The table presents mean and median values for all variables based on the classification of DCFFA. The significance of the 
difference in means (medians) between the sub-groups is based on a t-test (Wilcoxon test). DCFFA takes the value 1 if 
interest paid is classified in cash flows from financing activities and 0 if in cash flows from operating activities. DLOSS 
takes the value 1 if the company reported losses during year t and 0 otherwise. Altman is Altman (1968) Z score. LEV, is 
total liabilities over total assets. ΔLEV is the difference in leverage between the year of IFRS adoption and the year before. 
Binding takes the value 1 if the firm has binding or restricted debt covenants in the year of adoption, and 0 otherwise. 
Public_Debt% is the percentage of long-term liabilities stemming from bonds or preference shares. Materiality is interest 
paid divided by operating cash flows before interest paid or received. CFO_COV is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if 
the firm has CFO-related covenants and 0 otherwise. Acc_Exp takes the value 1 if the audit committee includes a director 
with accounting experience, and 0 otherwise. B_IND is the % of independent directors serving on the board excluding the 
chairman. Board Size is the number of directors serving on the company’s Board of Directors. BS, is the natural logarithm of 
Board Size. Auditor takes the value 1if the company is audited by a big4 auditor and 0 otherwise.  Audit_Fees is the 
percentage of audit fees to total assets. CFO_FOR takes the value of 1 if there is at least one CFO forecast for the year of the 
IFRS switch, and 0 otherwise. CFO/OI is cash flow from operations before interest paid divided by operating profit. DSEO 
takes the value 1 if the firm is involved in a seasoned equity offering in the year of the switch, and 0 otherwise. DMEET 
takes the value 1 if the firm met or beat at least one CFO forecast, and 0 otherwise. ROA is operating income divided by total 
assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. TQt is Tobin’s q computed as market value of equity, plus total liabilities 
divided by total assets at the end of the IFRS adoption year, denoted as t. ΔTQ is the difference in Τobin’s q between t and t-
1.  SalesGr is the percentage difference in firm revenue between year t and t-1. IND_Q is the median industry TQ. CL takes 
the value 1 if the firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange and 0 otherwise. Analyst Following, is the number of analysts who 
have issued at least one recommendation for the company in year t. FOLL is the natural logarithm Analyst Following.  PPE 
is the ratio of Property Plant and Equipment to total sales. ΔROA04 is the difference in net income for year 2004 reported 
under IFRS and under UK GAAP. a,b,c denote significance at the 1%, 5%,  and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Classification choice variables 
 Mean values Median Values 
 
DCFFA=1 
N=74 
DCFFA=0 
N=155 
Difference DCFFA=1 
N=74 
DCFFA=0 
N=155 
Difference 
DLOSS 0.108 0.084 0.024 0 0 0 
Altman 2.343 2.219 0.124 2.119 2.122 -0.003 
ΔLEV 0.034 -0.008 0.042b 0.031 0.010 0.021 
Binding 0.297 0.368 -0.071 0 0 0 
Public_debt% 0.072 0.022 0.050
b
 0 0 0
b
 
Materiality 0.123 0.135 -0.012 0.103 0.108 -0.005 
CFO_COV 0.108 0.064 0.044 0 0 0 
Acc_Exp 0.540 0.626 -0.086 1 1 0 
B_Ind 0.501 0.513 -0.012 0.500 0.500 0 
Board Size 9.257 8.413 0.844
a
 9 8 1
a
 
BS 2.198 2.092 0.106
a
 2.197 2.079 0.118
a
 
Auditor 0.946 0.929 0.017 1 1 0 
Audit_Fees 0.001 0.001 0
c
 0.001 0.001 0 
CFO_FOR 0.662 0.735 -0.073 1 1 0 
CFO/OI 1.041 1.133 -0.092 1.034 1.036 -0.002 
DSEO 0.189 0.271 -0.082 0 0 0
c
 
DMEET 0.622 0.542 0.080 1 1 0 
ROA 0.115 0.105 0.010 0.110 0.106 0.004 
SIZE  13.702 13.387 0.315 13.397 13.154 0.243 
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Panel B: Additional valuation variables 
 Mean values Median Values 
N=224 DCFFA=1 DCFFA=0 Difference DCFFA=1 DCFFA=0 Difference 
TQ 1.893 1.741 0.152 1.633 1.529 0.104
c
 
ΔTQ (N=220) 0.035 0.062 -0.027 0.019 0.060 -0.041 
       
SalesGr 0.178 0.142 0.036 0.053 0.072 -0.019 
IND_Q 1.625 1.601 0.024 1.542 1.542 0 
LEV 0.619 0.603 0.016 0.605 0.608 -0.003 
CL 0.315 0.252 0.063 0 0 0 
Analyst Following 12.113 10.143 1.970 12 8 4
b
 
FOLL 1.669 1.590 0.079 2.197 1.792 0.405 
ΔROA04 -0.076 -0.011 -0.065 -0.004 -0.007 0.003 
PPE 0.419 0.447 -0.028 0.229 0.174 0.055 
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TABLE 2:  Correlations 
The table presents correlation coefficients and their corresponding significance (in second row). Panel A presents correlations of the variables in the classification choice model. Panel B 
represents correlations of the variables in the valuation model. DCFFA takes the value 1 if interest paid is classified in cash flows from financing activities and 0 if in cash flows from operating 
activities. DLOSS takes the value 1 if the company reported losses during year t and 0 otherwise. Altman is Altman (1968) Z score. LEV, is total liabilities over total assets. ΔLEV is the 
difference in leverage between the year of IFRS adoption and the year before. Binding takes the value 1 if the firm has binding or restricted debt covenants in the year of adoption, and 0 
otherwise. Public_Debt% is the percentage of long-term liabilities stemming from bonds or preference shares. Materiality is interest paid divided by operating cash flows before interest paid or 
received. CFO_COV is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm has CFO-related covenants and 0 otherwise. Acc_Exp takes the value 1 if the audit committee includes a director with 
accounting experience, and 0 otherwise. B_IND is the % of independent directors serving on the board excluding the chairman. BS is the natural logarithm of the number of directors serving on 
the company’s Board of Directors. Auditor takes the value 1if the company is audited by a big4 auditor and 0 otherwise.  Audit_Fees is the percentage of audit fees to total assets. CFO_FOR 
takes the value of 1 if there is at least one CFO forecast for the year of the IFRS switch, and 0 otherwise. CFO/OI is cash flow from operations before interest paid divided by operating profit. 
DSEO takes the value 1 if the firm is involved in a seasoned equity offering in the year of the switch, and 0 otherwise. DMEET takes the value 1 if the firm met or beat at least one CFO forecast, 
and 0 otherwise. ROA is operating income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. TQ is Tobin’s q computed as market value of equity, plus total liabilities divided 
by total assets at the end of the IFRS adoption year, denoted as t. ΔTQ is the difference in Τobin’s q between t and t-1.  SalesGr is the percentage difference in firm revenue between year t and t-
1. IND_Q is the median industry TQ. CL takes the value 1 if the firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange and 0 otherwise. FOLL is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who have 
issued at least one recommendation for the company in year t.  PPE is the ratio of Property Plant and Equipment to total sales. ΔROA04 is the difference in net income for year 2004 reported 
under IFRS and under UK GAAP. a,b,c denote significance at the 1%, 5%,  and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A: Classification choice variables (N=229) 
 DLOSS Altman ΔLEV Binding Public_ 
Debt% 
Materi
ality 
CFO_
COV 
BS Acc_Exp B_IND Auditor Audit_ 
Fees 
CFO 
_FOR 
CFO/OI DSEO DMEET ROA SIZE 
DCFFA 0.039 
0.55 
0.32 
0.63 
0.141b 
0.03 
-0.069 
0.30 
0.202a 
0.01 
-0.043 
0.51 
0.075 
0.25 
0.185a 
0.01 
-0.081 
0.22 
-0.046 
0.48 
0.032 
0.63 
-0.094 
0.16 
-0.076 
0.25 
-0.024 
0.72 
-0.089 
0.18 
0.075 
0.26 
0.046 
0.49 
0.086 
0.19 
DLOSS  -0.241a 
0.01 
-0.101 
0.13 
0.119c 
0.07 
-0.050 
0.45 
0.006 
0.93 
-0.036 
0.58 
-0.161a 
0.01 
0.106 
0.11 
-0.076 
0.25 
-0.038 
0.56 
0.114c 
0.08 
-0.065 
0.33 
-0.058 
0.38 
0.101 
0.13 
-0.181a 
0.01 
-0.598a 
0.01 
-0.233a 
0.01 
Altman   -0.144b 
0.03 
-0.269a 
0.01 
-0.136b 
0.04 
-0.082 
0.21 
-0.043 
0.51 
-0.026 
0.70 
-0.141b 
0.03 
-0.062 
0.35 
-0.054 
0.41 
0.020 
0.76 
0.006 
0.93 
0.007 
0.91 
-0.117c 
0.08 
-0.013 
0.84 
0.366a 
0.01 
-0.086 
0.19 
ΔLEV    -0.073 
0.27 
-0.014 
0.84 
0.078 
0.24 
-0.113c 
0.09 
0.129b 
0.05 
0.042 
0.53 
-0.021 
0.75 
0.206a 
0.01 
-0.323a 
0.01 
-0.044 
0.50 
0.177a 
0.01 
-0.057 
0.39 
0.092 
0.16 
-0.170a 
0.01 
0.144b 
0.03 
Binding     0.132b 
0.04 
0.046 
0.49 
0.129b 
0.05 
-0.023 
0.72 
-0.005 
0.94 
0.218a 
0.01 
0.081 
0.22 
0.113c 
0.09 
0.015 
0.81 
-0.080 
0.23 
0.185a 
0.01 
-0.053 
0.43 
-0.211a 
0.01 
0.019 
0.77 
Public_ 
debt% 
     0.202a 
0.01 
0.160a 
0.01 
0.220a 
0.01 
-0.048 
0.47 
0.166a 
0.01 
0.085 
0.20 
-0.148b 
0.02 
0.058 
0.38 
-0.006 
0.93 
0.022 
0.74 
0.027 
0.69 
0.008 
0.90 
0.370a 
0.01 
Materiality       0.047 
0.47 
0.014 
0.82 
0.082 
0.31 
0.046 
0.49 
0.154b 
0.02 
-0.203a 
0.01 
0.108c 
0.10 
0.008 
0.90 
0.105 
0.11 
0.047 
0.48 
-0.133b 
0.04 
0.206a 
0.01 
CFO_COV        0.137b 
0.04 
-0.058 
0.38 
0.129b 
0.05 
0.012 
0.86 
-0.013 
0.85 
0.114c 
0.08 
-0.033 
0.61 
0.022 
0.73 
0.091 
0.17 
0.050 
0.45 
0.180a 
0.01 
BS         0.114c 
0.08 
0.189a 
0.01 
0.251a 
0.01 
-0.327a 
0.01 
-0.112c 
0.09 
0.061 
0.36 
-0.023 
0.72 
0.043 
0.51 
0.044 
0.50 
0.690a 
0.01 
Acc_Exp          0.025 
0.70 
0.035 
0.60 
-0.084 
0.20 
-0.030 
0.65 
-0.072 
0.27 
0.010 
0.88 
0.112c 
0.09 
-0.131b 
0.05 
0.008 
0.90 
B_IND           0.194a 
0.01 
-0.133b 
0.04 
0.067 
0.31 
-0.039 
0.56 
0.032 
0.63 
0.101 
0.12 
-0.002 
0.97 
0.469a 
0.01 
Auditor            -0.325a 
0.01 
0.0264 
0.69 
-0.040 
0.54 
0.068 
0.30 
0.125c 
0.06 
0.022 
0.73 
0.302a 
0.01 
Audit_Fees             -0.050 
0.45 
-0.144b 
0.03 
0.072 
0.28 
-0.090 
0.17 
0.050 
0.45 
-0.541a 
0.01 
CFO_FOR              -0.027 
0.68 
-0.064 
0.33 
0.690a 
0.01 
0.145b 
0.03 
0.006 
0.93 
CFO/OI               -0.054 
0.41 
0.032 
0.63 
-0.044 
0.50 
0.108c 
0.10 
DSEO                -0.098 
0.14 
-0.154b 
0.02 
0.054 
0.42 
DMEET                 0.167a 
0.01 
0.064 
0.33 
ROA                  0.088 
0.19 
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Panel B: Valuation model variables (N=224 unless noted otherwise) 
 ΔTQ 
(N=220) 
DCFFA FOLL CL IND_Q SalesGr PPE ΔROA04 LEV SIZE ROA ΔLEV Altman Binding Materiality CFO_ 
FOR 
Auditor 
TQ 0.163a 
0.01 
0.091 
0.17 
0.104 
0.12 
-0.053 
0.43 
0.325a 
0.01 
-0.063 
0.35 
-0.154b 
0.02 
-0.034 
0.62 
-0.069 
0.30 
-0.277a 
0.01 
0.337a 
0.01 
-0.066 
0.32 
0.044 
0.51 
-0.055 
0.41 
-0.2595a 
0.01 
0.0988 
0.14 
-0.0309 
0.64 
ΔTQ (N=220) 
 
 -0.062 
0.36 
-0.053 
0.43 
-0.111c 
0.10 
0.027 
0.69 
-0.002 
0.97 
0.084 
0.21 
0.044 
0.52 
0.012 
0.86 
-0.068 
0.31 
0.044 
0.52 
0.241a 
0.01 
-0.048 
0.48 
0.045 
0.50 
0.0223 
0.74 
-0.0562 
0.41 
0.0465 
0.49 
DCFFA   0.033 
0.63 
0.045 
0.50 
0.052 
0.44 
0.030 
0.65 
-0.017 
0.80 
-0.079 
0.24 
0.035 
0.60 
0.087 
0.19 
0.050 
0.46 
0.130b 
0.05 
0.034 
0.61 
-0.056 
0.41 
-0.0482 
0.47 
-0.0735 
0.27 
0.0338 
0.61 
FOLL    0.124c 
0.06 
-0.054 
0.42 
0.001 
0.99 
-0.082 
0.22 
-0.020 
0.76 
0.071 
0.29 
0.324a 
0.01 
0.210a 
0.01 
0.119c 
0.07 
-0.010 
0.88 
-0.031 
0.64 
0.0601 
0.37 
0.6920a 
0.01 
0.1593b 
0.02 
CL     -0.077 
0.25 
-0.021 
0.75 
0.112c 
0.09 
0.050 
0.45 
0.032 
0.64 
0.544a 
0.01 
-0.008 
0.90 
0.013 
0.84 
-0.175a 
0.01 
0.203a 
0.01 
0.0227 
0.73 
-0.0276 
0.68 
0.1101c 
0.10 
IND_Q      -0.094 
0.16 
0.038 
0.57 
0.032 
0.63 
-0.027 
0.69 
-0.264a 
0.01 
-0.096 
0.15 
0.093 
0.17 
-0.173a 
0.01 
0.047 
0.49 
-0.1140c 
0.09 
-0.0593 
0.38 
0.0516 
0.44 
SalesGr       0.098 
0.14 
0.015 
0.83 
-0.167a 
0.01 
0.076 
0.25 
0.194a 
0.01 
0.052 
0.44 
0.017 
0.80 
-0.039 
0.55 
-0.0532 
0.43 
-0.0230 
0.73 
0.0423 
0.53 
PPE        0.049 
0.46 
-0.069 
0.31 
0.172a 
0.01 
0.004 
0.95 
0.109c 
0.10 
-0.175a 
0.01 
-0.019 
0.78 
0.1886a 
0.01 
-0.1234c 
0.06 
0.0392 
0.56 
ΔROA04         0.039 
0.56 
0.102 
0.13 
-0.061 
0.36 
0.153b 
0.02 
-0.047 
0.48 
0.002 
0.97 
0.0749 
0.26 
-0.0632 
0.35 
0.0480 
0.47 
LEV          0.224a 
0.01 
-0.191a 
0.01 
0.121c 
0.07 
-0.107 
0.11 
0.250a 
0.01 
0.2949a 
0.01 
0.0622 
0.35 
0.1356b 
0.04 
SIZE           0.061 
0.36 
0.168a 
0.01 
-0.087 
0.19 
0.020 
0.76 
0.2027a 
0.01 
-0.0010 
0.99 
0.3036a 
0.01 
ROA            -0.118c 
0.08 
0.388a 
0.01 
-0.221a 
0.01 
-0.1708a 
0.01 
0.1212c 
0.07 
0.0279 
0.68 
ΔLEV             -0.148b 
0.03 
-0.046 
0.49 
0.1150c 
0.09 
-0.0514 
0.44 
0.2165a 
0.01 
Altman              -0.273a 
0.01 
-0.0842 
0.21 
0.0017 
0.98 
-0.0534 
0.43 
Binding               0.0504 
0.45 
0.0288 
0.67 
0.0788 
0.24 
Materiality                0.1167c 
0.08 
0.1580b 
0.02 
CFO_FOR                 0.0310 
0.64 
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TABLE 3 – Classification choice results 
The table presents logistic regression results explaining a firm’s classification choice. The dependent variable is DCFFA that 
takes the value 1 if interest paid is classified in cash flows from financing activities and 0 if in cash flows from operating 
activities. DLOSS takes the value 1 if the company reported losses during year t and 0 otherwise. Altman is Altman (1968) Z 
score. LEV, is total liabilities over total assets. ΔLEV is the difference in leverage between the year of IFRS adoption and the 
year before. Binding takes the value 1 if the firm has binding or restricted debt covenants in the year of adoption, and 0 
otherwise. Public_Debt% is the percentage of long-term liabilities stemming from bonds or preference shares. Materiality is 
interest paid divided by operating cash flows before interest paid or received. CFO_COV is an indicator variable taking the 
value 1 if the firm has CFO-related covenants and 0 otherwise. Acc_Exp takes the value 1 if the audit committee includes a 
director with accounting experience, and 0 otherwise. B_IND is the % of independent directors serving on the board 
excluding the chairman. BS is the natural logarithm of the number of directors serving on the company’s Board of Directors. 
Auditor takes the value 1if the company is audited by a big4 auditor and 0 otherwise.  Audit_Fees is the percentage of audit 
fees to total assets. CFO_FOR takes the value of 1 if there is at least one CFO forecast for the year of the IFRS switch, and 0 
otherwise. CFO/OI is cash flow from operations before interest paid divided by operating profit. DSEO takes the value 1 if 
the firm is involved in a seasoned equity offering in the year of the switch, and 0 otherwise. DMEET takes the value 1 if the 
firm met or beat at least one CFO forecast, and 0 otherwise. ROA is operating income divided by total assets. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. a,b,c denote significance at the 1%, 5%,  and 10% level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Intercept -0.9028 
0.58 
-2.7116
b
 
0.05 
-0.7722 
0.68 
0.2271 
0.92 
 Variables capturing Contractual Incentives:  
ΔLEV 3.8109b 
0.02 
  3.4487
b
 
0.05 
DLOSS 1.8376
a
 
0.01 
  1.9764
a
 
0.01 
Altman 0.2417 
0.13 
  -0.0035 
0.98 
Materiality -1.4164 
0.53 
  -2.2279 
0.42 
Materiality*Altman -0.4672 
0.58 
  0.9876 
0.38 
Binding -1.4457
a
 
0.01 
  -0.0476 
0.94 
Materiality*BINDING 5.0524
c
 
0.07 
  -0.9382 
0.78 
Public_Debt% 4.8128
a
 
0.01 
  4.8920
a
 
0.01 
CFO_COV 3.9296
b
 
0.05 
  1.7182 
0.37 
CFO_COV*Altman -1.6789
c
 
0.08 
  -0.6383 
0.50 
 Variables capturing Market Incentives:  
CFO_FOR  -1.0995
a
 
0.01 
 -1.5876
a
 
0.01 
CFO/ΟΙ  -0.1022 
0.31 
 -0.1426 
0.23 
DSEO  -0.5999 
0.11 
 -0.4385 
0.32 
DMEET  1.5118
a
 
0.01 
 1.5901
a
 
0.01 
 Corporate Governance Variables: 
Acc_Exp   -0.6536
b
 
0.04 
-0.7454
b
 
0.04 
B_IND   -0.4652 
0.76 
-1.4603 
0.42 
BS   2.6255
a
 
0.01 
1.7017
c
 
0.07 
Auditor   -0.6376 
0.33 
-0.5799 
0.45 
Audit_Fees   -582.0
b
 
0.04 
-583.8
c
 
0.07 
 Control variables: 
ROA 0.8856 
0.71 
-0.7078 
0.68 
0.4655 
0.77 
3.9322 
0.13 
SIZE 0.0175 
0.87 
0.1715
c
 
0.07 
-0.2524 
0.16 
-0.1995 
0.33 
     
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
N 231 231 229 229 
Pseudo R
2 
0.2125 0.1405 0.1436 0.2978 
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TABLE 4:  Valuation Results 
Panel A presents regression results where the dependent variable in column (1a) is TQ and in column (1b) ΔTQ. Panel B 
shows the model used in the first stage to derive the endogeneity correction and it is based on model 4 of Table 3 plus the 
additional variables included in the valuation models. TQ is Tobin’s q computed as market value of equity, plus total 
liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the IFRS adoption year, denoted as t. ΔTQ is the difference in Τobin’s q 
between t and t-1. DCFFA takes the value 1 if interest paid is classified in cash flows from financing activities and 0 if in 
cash flows from operating activities.  DLOSS takes the value 1 if the company reported losses during year t and 0 otherwise. 
Altman is Altman (1968) Z score. LEV, is total liabilities over total assets. ΔLEV is the difference in leverage between the 
year of IFRS adoption and the year before. Binding takes the value 1 if the firm has binding or restricted debt covenants in 
the year of adoption, and 0 otherwise. Public_Debt% is the percentage of long-term liabilities stemming from bonds or 
preference shares. Materiality is interest paid divided by operating cash flows before interest paid or received. CFO_COV is 
an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm has CFO-related covenants and 0 otherwise. Acc_Exp takes the value 1 if 
the audit committee includes a director with accounting experience, and 0 otherwise. B_IND is the % of independent 
directors serving on the board excluding the chairman. BS is the natural logarithm of the number of directors serving on the 
company’s Board of Directors. Auditor takes the value 1if the company is audited by a big4 auditor and 0 otherwise.  
Audit_Fees is the percentage of audit fees to total assets. CFO_FOR takes the value of 1 if there is at least one CFO forecast 
for the year of the IFRS switch, and 0 otherwise. CFO/OI is cash flow from operations before interest paid divided by 
operating profit. DSEO takes the value 1 if the firm is involved in a seasoned equity offering in the year of the switch, and 0 
otherwise. DMEET takes the value 1 if the firm met or beat at least one CFO forecast, and 0 otherwise. ROA is operating 
income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. TQ is Tobin’s q computed as market value of 
equity, plus total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the IFRS adoption year, denoted as t. ΔTQ is the difference in 
Τobin’s q between t and t-1.  SalesGr is the percentage difference in firm revenue between year t and t-1. IND_Q is the 
median industry TQ. CL takes the value 1 if the firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange and 0 otherwise. FOLL is the natural 
logarithm of the number of analysts who have issued at least one recommendation for the company in year t.  PPE is the 
ratio of Property Plant and Equipment to total sales. ΔROA04 is the difference in net income for year 2004 reported under 
IFRS and under UK GAAP.λ is the Inverse Mills ratio and is estimated from the model presented in panel B of Table 4. a,b,c 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%,  and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Second stage Valuation Results 
 (1a) (1b) 
Intercept 2.0273
b
 
0.02 
0.2837 
0.29 
DCFFA -0.3850
b
 
0.02 
-0.1116
b
 
0.02 
SalesGr -0.0936 
0.25 
-0.0134 
0.59 
IND_Q 1.1221
a
 
0.01 
-0.0570 
0.58 
ROA 3.5762
a
 
0.01 
0.2658 
0.17 
LEV 0.1608 
0.52 
0.0064 
0.93 
ΔLEV -0.6130 
0.12 
0.3542
a
 
0.01 
Altman -0.1025
b
 
0.03 
-0.0002 
0.99 
Binding -0.0401 
0.79 
0.0559 
0.24 
Materiality -1.3663
b
 
0.04 
0.0434 
0.83 
Materiality * Altman 0.2830 
0.28 
-0.0293 
0.72 
Materiality*Binding 0.6820 
0.37 
0.0309 
0.90 
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CFO_COV -0.9996
b
 
0.04 
-0.2058 
0.17 
CFO_COV * Altman 0.4211
c
 
0.07 
0.1040 
0.14 
Auditor 0.0468 
0.80 
0.0098 
0.86 
CFO_FOR 0.1000 
0.53 
-0.0297 
0.54 
CL 0.1184 
0.15 
-0.0373 
0.14 
FOLL 0.0363 
0.58 
-0.0032 
0.87 
PPE -0.0380 
0.55 
0.0294 
0.13 
ΔROA04 0.1793 
0.12 
0.0304 
0.39 
SIZE -0.1684
a
 
0.01 
-0.0138 
0.26 
λ -0.2108a 
0.01 
-0.0284
c
 
0.08 
Industry fixed effects YES YES 
N 224 220 
Adjusted R
2 
0.3475 0.0812 
 
Panel B: First Stage Model 
Intercept 0.1686 
0.96 
Variables in the classification choice and valuation models: 
ΔLEV 2.6478 
0.15 
Altman 0.0120 
0.95 
Binding -0.1751 
0.78 
ROA 4.3564 
0.12 
SIZE -0.2534 
0.28 
Materiality -1.6939 
0.54 
Materiality * Altman 0.6947 
0.53 
Materiality*Binding -1.0829 
0.76 
CFO_COV 1.9207 
0.32 
CFO_COV * Altman -0.7260 
0.43 
Auditor -0.9243 
0.25 
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CFOA_FOR -1.7310
b 
0.02 
Instruments: 
DLOSS 1.9149
b 
0.03 
Public_Debt% 5.2721
a 
0.01 
Acc_Exp -0.7071
b 
0.05 
B_IND -1.1105 
0.56 
BS 1.8661
c 
0.06 
Audit_Fees -637.8
c 
0.06 
CFO/OI -0.2159 
0.13 
DSEO -0.4554 
0.32 
DMEET 1.4192
b 
0.03 
Variables in the valuation model: 
SalesGr 0.0064 
0.98 
IND_Q 0.0929 
0.94 
CL -0.0013 
0.99 
FOLL 0.0947 
0.72 
PPE -0.2679 
0.32 
ΔROA04 -0.7272 
0.43 
LEV 1.3973 
0.19 
  
Industry fixed effects YES 
N 228 
Pseudo R
2 
0.3186 
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TABLE 5:  Reporting incentives 
In panel A the dependent variable is DCFFA that takes the value 1 if interest paid is classified in cash flows from financing 
activities and 0 if in cash flows from operating activities. In Panel B the dependent variable is TQ and in Panel C, ΔTQ. TQ is 
Tobin’s q computed as market value of equity, plus total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the IFRS adoption 
year, denoted as t. ΔTQ is the difference in Τobin’s q between t and t-1.  DLOSS takes the value 1 if the company reported 
losses during year t and 0 otherwise. Altman is Altman (1968) Z score. LEV, is total liabilities over total assets. ΔLEV is the 
difference in leverage between the year of IFRS adoption and the year before. Binding takes the value 1 if the firm has 
binding or restricted debt covenants in the year of adoption, and 0 otherwise. Public_Debt% is the percentage of long-term 
liabilities stemming from bonds or preference shares. CFO_COV is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm has 
CFO-related covenants and 0 otherwise. Materiality is interest paid divided by operating cash flows before interest paid or 
received. Acc_Exp takes the value 1 if the audit committee includes a director with accounting experience, and 0 otherwise. 
B_IND is the % of independent directors serving on the board excluding the chairman. BS is the natural logarithm of the 
number of directors serving on the company’s Board of Directors. Auditor takes the value 1if the company is audited by a 
big4 auditor and 0 otherwise.  Audit_Fees is the percentage of audit fees to total assets. CFO_FOR takes the value of 1 if 
there is at least one CFO forecast for the year of the IFRS switch, and 0 otherwise. CFO/OI is cash flow from operations 
before interest paid divided by operating profit. DSEO takes the value 1 if the firm is involved in a seasoned equity offering 
in the year of the switch, and 0 otherwise. DMEET takes the value 1 if the firm met or beat at least one CFO forecast, and 0 
otherwise. ROA is operating income divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. SalesGr is the 
percentage difference in firm revenue between year t and t-1. IND_Q is the median industry TQ. CL takes the value 1 if the 
firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange and 0 otherwise. FOLL is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who have 
issued at least one recommendation for the company in year t.  PPE is the ratio of Property Plant and Equipment to total 
sales. ΔROA04 is the difference in net income for year 2004 reported under IFRS and under UK GAAP. DA is discretionary 
accruals from the modified Jones model. VAR(ΔΝΙ/TA) is the variability of the firm’s change in net income deflated by total 
assets calculated over five years prior to the IFRS switch. SPOS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the net 
income divided by total assets is in the range of [0 to 0.01]. λ is the Inverse Mills ratio and is estimated from the model 
presented in panel B of Table 4.  a,b,c denote significance at the 1%, 5%,  and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A:  Classification choice  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.2216 
0.92 
0.2427 
0.92 
0.2305 
0.92 
-0.2359 
0.92 
ΔLEV 3.2051c 
0.07 
3.1425
c
 
0.07 
2.8809
c
 
0.10 
3.6596
b
 
0.05 
DLOSS 1.7467
b
 
0.03 
1.7471
b
 
0.03 
1.7395
b
 
0.03 
1.7084
b
 
0.05 
Altman -0.0286 
0.87 
-0.0140 
0.94 
0.0285 
0.88 
-0.0077 
0.97 
Materiality -2.2768 
0.40 
-2.2581 
0.41 
-1.9235 
0.49 
-2.2671 
0.43 
Materiality*Altman 1.1228 
0.32 
1.0384 
0.36 
0.8621 
0.46 
1.1213 
0.35 
Binding -0.0190 
0.97 
-0.0390 
0.95 
0.0889 
0.88 
0.1056 
0.86 
Materiality*Binding -0.09953 
0.77 
-0.8725 
0.79 
-1.2480 
0.71 
-1.0011 
0.77 
Public_Debt% 4.8424
a
 
0.01 
4.8295
a
 
0.01 
4.6715
a
 
0.01 
4.4875
a
 
0.01 
CFO_COV 1.6537 
0.39 
1.6416 
0.39 
1.4976 
0.44 
1.8352 
0.37 
CFO_COV* Altman -0.5986 
0.52 
-0.6090 
0.52 
-0.5562 
0.56 
-0.7321 
0.46 
Acc_Exp -0.7270
b
 
0.04 
-0.7667
b
 
0.03 
-0.7819
b
 
0.03 
-0.8183
b
 
0.03 
B_IND -1.3405 
0.47 
-1.3228 
0.47 
-1.6059 
0.38 
-1.4937 
0.42 
BS 1.7365
c
 
0.07 
1.7956c 
0.06 
1.9627
b
 
0.04 
1.4936 
0.13 
Auditor -0.7014 
0.37 
-0.6559 
0.40 
-0.6575 
0.40 
-1.0041 
0.22 
Audit_Fees -581.9
c
 
0.07 
-576.3
c
 
0.08 
-564.3
c
 
0.08 
-519.5 
0.11 
CFO_FOR -1.5296
b
 
0.02 
-1.5300
b
 
0.02 
-1.6428
a
 
0.01 
-1.5152
b
 
0.02 
CFO/OI -0.1918 
0.16 
-0.1856 
0.18 
-0.1494 
0.24 
-0.2496 
0.16 
DSEO -0.5181 
0.25 
-0.5019 
0.26 
-0.4614 
0.30 
-0.4516 
0.32 
DMEET 1.5374
a
 
0.01 
1.5766
a
 
0.01 
1.6127
a
 
0.01 
1.4685
b
 
0.02 
ROA 3.7994 
0.15 
3.5850 
0.17 
2.8104 
0.31 
3.8930 
0.15 
SIZE -0.1874 
0.36 
-0.2065 
0.31 
-0.2058 
0.31 
-0.0911 
0.66 
ΔROA04 -0.6626 
0.45 
   
SPOS  -0.1208 
0.92 
  
VAR(ΔNI/TA)   -6.4606 
0.61 
 
DA    -4.1020 
0.26 
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Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
N 228 228 221 217 
Pseudo R
2 
0.3014 0.2946 0.3044 0.3077 
           
 
Panel B: Firm Valuation  
   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 2.0605
b
 
0.02 
2.0115
b
 
0.02 
2.0550
b
 
0.02 
DCFFA -0.3968
b
 
0.02 
-0.3260
c
 
0.06 
-0.3891
b
 
0.02 
SalesGr -0.0919 
0.26 
-0.0953 
0.24 
-0.0959 
0.25 
IND_Q 1.1317
a
 
0.01 
1.1384
a
 
0.01 
1.0723
a
 
0.01 
ROA 3.5962
a
 
0.01 
3.7372
a
 
0.01 
3.5768
a
 
0.01 
LEV 0.1433 
0.57 
0.1771 
0.49 
0.1268 
0.63 
ΔLEV -0.6274 
0.11 
-0.6805
c
 
0.09 
-0.5406 
0.19 
Altman -0.0994
b
 
0.04 
-0.1052
b
 
0.03 
-0.1051
b
 
0.03 
Binding -0.0356 
0.81 
0.0003 
0.99 
0.0177 
0.91 
Materiality -1.3206
b
 
0.05 
-1.3031
c
 
0.06 
-1.3852
b
 
0.04 
Materiality * Altman 0.2692 
0.31 
0.3126 
0.24 
0.3245 
0.22 
Materiality*Binding 0.6716 
0.38 
0.5320 
0.49 
0.4756 
0.54 
CFO_COV -1.0086
b
 
0.04 
-0.9067
c
 
0.07 
-1.1743
b
 
0.03 
CFO_COV * Altman 0.4278
c
 
0.06 
0.3703 
0.11 
0.4921
b
 
0.04 
Auditor 0.0604 
0.75 
-0.0342 
0.86 
0.0116 
0.95 
CFO_FOR 0.1107 
0.49 
0.0666 
0.69 
0.0971 
0.57 
CL 0.1245 
0.14 
0.1506
c
 
0.08 
0.1290 
0.16 
FOLL 0.0336 
0.61 
0.0489 
0.48 
0.0492 
0.49 
PPE -0.0350 
0.58 
-0.0409 
0.52 
-0.0352 
0.58 
ΔROA04 0.1857 
0.11 
0.1561 
0.19 
0.1787 
0.13 
SIZE -0.1735
a
 
0.01 
-0.1681
a
 
0.01 
-0.1619
a
 
0.01 
SPOS 0.1649 
0.53 
  
VAR(ΔNI/TA)  -0.8306 
0.27 
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DA   0.8191 
0.36 
    
λ -0.2176a 
0.01 
-0.1844
a
 
0.01 
-0.2089
a
 
0.01 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES 
N 224 217 213 
Adjusted R
2 
0.3454 0.3491 0.3518 
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Panel C: Changes in firm value    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.2816 
0.29 
0.2762 
0.31 
0.2749 
0.32 
DCFFA -0.1108
b
 
0.03 
-0.0771 
0.15 
-0.1065
b
 
0.04 
SalesGr -0.0136 
0.59 
-0.0089 
0.72 
-0.0118 
0.64 
IND_Q -0.0576 
0.58 
-0.0296 
0.78 
-0.0536 
0.62 
ROA 0.2644 
0.17 
0.3791
c
 
0.06 
0.2627 
0.19 
LEV 0.0074 
0.92 
0.0238 
0.76 
0.0088 
0.91 
ΔLEV 0.3552a 
0.01 
0.3449
a
 
0.01 
0.3606
a
 
0.01 
Altman -0.0004 
0.98 
-0.0037 
0.80 
-0.0007 
0.96 
Binding 0.0557 
0.24 
0.0624 
0.19 
0.0512 
0.30 
Materiality 0.0407 
0.84 
0.0508 
0.81 
0.0226 
0.92 
Materiality * Altman -0.0285 
0.73 
-0.0156 
0.85 
-0.0295 
0.72 
Materiality*Binding 0.0313 
0.90 
-0.0265 
0.92 
0.0426 
0.87 
CFO_COV -0.2052 
0.17 
-0.1438 
0.35 
-0.2072 
0.20 
CFO_COV * Altman 0.1035 
0.14 
0.0743 
0.30 
0.1065 
0.15 
Auditor 0.0090 
0.88 
-0.0235 
0.70 
0.0250 
0.69 
CFO_FOR -0.0303 
0.53 
-0.0511 
0.33 
-0.0337 
0.52 
CL -0.0377 
0.14 
-0.0314 
0.24 
-0.0377 
0.18 
FOLL -0.0031 
0.88 
0.0007 
0.97 
-0.0031 
0.89 
PPE 0.0292 
0.13 
0.0239 
0.22 
0.0273 
0.17 
ΔROA04 0.0300 
0.40 
0.0192 
0.60 
0.0310 
0.40 
SIZE -0.0135 
0.28 
-0.0168 
0.18 
-0.0146 
0.25 
SPOS -0.0100 
0.90 
  
VAR(ΔNI/TA)  -0.4507b 
0.05 
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DA   0.2442 
0.38 
    
λ -0.0280c 
0.09 
-0.0137 
0.44 
-0.0272
c
 
0.10 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES 
N 220 214 210 
Adjusted R
2 
0.0765 0.0857 0.0669 
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TABLE 6: Alternative dates for measuring TQ 
The dependent variable in column (1) is TQt+1 and in column (2) TQt-1. Results are obtained after correcting for self-selection 
bias (Heckman, 1979), based on the model presented in panel B of Table 4. TQ is Tobin’s q computed as market value of 
equity, plus total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the IFRS adoption year, denoted as t. DCFFA takes the value 
1 if interest paid is classified in cash flows from financing activities and 0 if in cash flows from operating activities. SalesGr 
is the percentage difference in firm revenue between year t and t-1. IND_Q is the median industry TQ. ROA is operating 
income divided by total assets. LEV, is total liabilities over total assets. ΔLEV is the difference in leverage between the year 
of IFRS adoption and the year before. Altman is Altman (1968) Z score. Binding takes the value 1 if the firm has binding or 
restricted debt covenants in the year of adoption, and 0 otherwise. Materiality is interest paid divided by operating cash 
flows before interest paid or received. CFO_COV is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm has CFO related 
covenants and 0 otherwise. CFO_FOR takes the value of 1 if there is at least one CFO forecast for the year of the IFRS 
switch, and 0 otherwise. CL takes the value 1 if the firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange and 0 otherwise. FOLL is the 
natural logarithm of the number of analysts who have issued at least one recommendation for the company in year t. PPE is 
the ratio of Property Plant and Equipment to total sales. ΔROA04 is the difference in net income for year 2004 reported under 
IFRS and under UK GAAP. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. λ is the Inverse Mills ratio and is estimated from the 
model presented in panel B of Table 4. a,b,c denote significance at the 1%, 5%,  and 10% level, respectively. 
             
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 3.6577
a
 
0.01 
2.6608
a
 
0.01 
DCFFA -0.3836
b
 
0.04 
-0.0517 
0.76 
SalesGr -0.0557 
0.55 
0.0246 
0.93 
IND_Q 0.4247 
0.35 
0.05516
a
 
0.01 
ROA 3.2476
a
 
0.01 
2.3270
a
 
0.01 
LEV -0.0177 
0.95 
0.6469
b
 
0.02 
ΔLEV -0.6537 
0.15 
-1.9502
a
 
0.01 
Altman -0.1398
a
 
0.01 
-0.0687 
0.14 
Binding -0.0396 
0.82 
-0.0792 
0.63 
Materiality -2.3104
a
 
0.01 
-1.5381
b
 
0.03 
Materiality * Altman 0.5783
b
 
0.05 
0.2063 
0.44 
Materiality*Binding 0.9188 
0.30 
0.4549 
0.59 
CFO_COV -1.3489
b
 
0.03 
-0.6269 
0.23 
CFO_COV * Altman 0.5507
b
 
0.05 
0.2740 
0.25 
Auditor 0.3065 
0.17 
-0.0850 
0.67 
CFO_FOR -0.0732 
0.69 
0.0876 
0.60 
CL 0.1462 
0.13 
0.1863
b
 
0.03 
FOLL 0.0958 0.0670 
55 
 
0.21 0.33 
PPE 0.0363 
0.67 
0.0176 
0.75 
ΔROA04 0.1210 
0.37 
0.0562 
0.65 
SIZE -0.2056
a
 
0.01 
-0.1684
a
 
0.01 
   
λ -0.1784a 
0.01 
-0.1043
c
 
0.07 
Industry fixed effects YES YES 
N 223 219 
Adjusted R
2 
0.2967 0.3141 
 
 
